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ARTICLES

POST-JUDGMENT RECONSIDERATION FOR
JUDICIAL ERROR IN CASES OF NON-TRIAL
ADJUDICATION UNDER THE OHIO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR
REFORM
Richard P. Perna*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that parties to litigation
should have available to them a procedural mechanism to challenge an
erroneous judgment. While an aggrieved party always has the right to
file an appeal to a higher court,' appeals are costly and time-consuming
procedures. To avoid unnecessary costs and delays and to achieve justice, the law has always recognized the wisdom of providing a method
for the trial court to self-correct errors it has made in arriving at its
final judgment in a case.' However, the countervailing principle of safeguarding the finality of judgments requires that matters fully adjudicated by a trial court must not be subject to open-ended
reconsideration.$
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; B.A. 1971, Villanova University;
J.D. 1975, Villanova University School of Law.
1. Of course, the right to file an appeal in Ohio is not an inherent right, but rather one
created by statute or constitution. See Lindblom v. Board of Tax Appeals, 151 Ohio St. 250, 253,
85 N.E.2d 376, 377 (1949); Young v. Shellenberger, 53 Ohio St. 291, 302, 41 N.E. 518, 522
(1895). Article IV of the Ohio Constitution has been interpreted to provide every litigant with at
least one review. State v. Nickles, 159 Ohio St. 353, 357, 112 N.E.2d 531, 534 (1953). See generally 4-5 OHIO JUR. 3D Appellate Review §§ 1-732 (1978). In addition to an appeal, in some
limited circumstances, a litigant can collaterally attack a judgment. See generally 63 OHIO JUR.
3D, supra, Judgments §§ 525-47.
2. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing a trial court's common law power to
affect its own judgments during term).
3. The doctrine of finality rests upon the necessity that there be an end to litigation. First
Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 68 Ohio St. 43, 49, 67 N.E. 91, 93 (1903); see also Mount Olive
Baptist Church v. Pipkins Paints and Home Improvement Center, Inc., 64 Ohio App. 2d 285, 287,
413 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1979) (discussing the policy which underlies vacation of judgments pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) (Anderson 1981)). See generally 63 OHIO JUR. 3D., supra note 1,
Judgments §§ 375-99.
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To satisfy these sometimes competing goals, the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rules") currently provide an Ohio litigant with two procedural devices which allow a trial court to review or

vacate its own final judgment. The first is the motion for relief from
and the second is the motion for new
judgment pursuant to Rule 60
5
59.
Rule
by
trial authorized

Relief from judgment is authorized by OHIO R. Civ. P. 60 as follows:
(A) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors .therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court
at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any,
as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(B) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence. which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (B)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules.
5. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A) provides that:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues upon
any of the following grounds:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, referee, or prevailing party, or
any order of the court or referee, or abuse of discretion, by which an aggrieved party was
prevented from having a fair trial;
(2) Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;
(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against;
(4) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice;
(5) Error in the amount of recovery, whether too large or too small, when the action is
upon a contract or for the injury or detention of property;
(6) The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence; however, only one
new trial may be granted on the weight of the evidence in the same case;
(7) The judgment is contrary to law;
(8) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which with reasonable
diligence he could not have discovered and produced at trial;
(9) Error of law occurring at the trial and brought to the attention of the trial court
by the party making the application.
In addition to the above grounds, a new trial may also be granted in the sound discretion of the court for good cause shown.
When a new trial is granted, the court shall specify in writing the grounds upon which
such new trial is granted.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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In Ohio, pursuant to Rule 58," an adjudication becomes final for
the purpose of appeal upon the entry of judgment. A litigant has thirty
days from the entry of that judgment to file a notice of appeal.' Yet,
post-judgment relief is not limited solely to the appeal process. A party
has fourteen days after the entry of judgment to move for a new trial,
and the filing of the new trial motion suspends the running of the thirty
day appeal period until after the trial court decides the new trial motion.' In some additional circumstances a party can move to vacate or
modify a final judgment during the pendency of the thirty day statutory appeal period pursuant to Rule 60.1 However, if a party fails to
file its motion for a new trial within fourteen days following the entry
of final judgment 10 and neglects to appeal within the thirty day limitation period for filing a notice of appeal,1 1 then the substantive correctness of the judgment will generally be beyond judicial review.12

judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and enter a new judgment.
6. OHIO R. Civ. P. 58 provides that upon the announcement of a decision or verdict "the
court shall promptly cause the judgment to be prepared and, the court having signed it, the clerk
shall thereupon enter it. A judgment is effective only when filed with the clerk for journalization
7. OHIo R. APP. P. 4(A) (Anderson 1981) provides that "in a civil case the notice of appeal
. . .shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within thirty days of the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from." With some exceptions, the statutory appeal period is
mandatory. See State ex rel. Kotch v. DeGrab, 168 Ohio St. 506, 507, 156 N.E.2d 465, 466
(1959).
8. See infra notes 10 and 88 and accompanying text.
9. A clerical mistake in a judgment can be remedied pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(A) at
any time. See generally infra note 115 and accompanying text. In addition, OHIo R. Civ. P. 60(B)
requires only that a motion seeking to vacate a judgment must be filed "within a reasonable
time," and for certain enumerated reasons "not more than one year after the judgment." Thus, an
OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment could be considered by the court. However, the litigant is in a classic dilemma because the filing of a OHIo R.
Civ. P. 60(B) motion will not suspend the running of the thirty day statutory appeal period pursuant to OHIo R. APP. P. 4(A). See infra note 88 and accompanying text. The court is not likely to
rule on the motion prior to the expiration of the thirty day statutory appeal period. In addition,
when a party's contentions challenge the correctness of the trial court's decision on the merits and
could have been raised on direct appeal, OHIo R. Civ. P. 60(B) cannot be used as an alternative
device through which to challenge the legal merits of a judgment. See Blasco v. Mislik, 69 Ohio
St. 2d 684, 686, 433 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1983); Dahl v. Kelling, 34 Ohio App. 3d 258, 259, 518
N.E.2d 582, 583 (1986); Town & Country Drive-In Shopping Centers v. Abraham, 46 Ohio App.
2d 262, 266, 348 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1975); Bosco v. City of Euclid, 38 Ohio App. 2d 40, 43, 311
N.E.2d 870, 873 (1974).
10. OHio R. Civ. P. 59(B) requires that a motion for new trial be filed "not later than
fourteen days after the entry of the judgment."
11. See supra note 7.
12. In some very limited instances, a final judgment may be reopened on motion pursuant to
OHIo R. Civ. P. 60. Relief from final judgment could be granted for clerical mistakes pursuant to
OHIo R. Civ. P. 60(A) or for any of the enumerated reasons set out in OHIo R. Civ. P. 60(B),
none of which would provide grounds for the trial court to review the substantive correctness of
the judgment.
See infra note
Published
by eCommons,
198820.
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Both Rule 59 and Rule 60 provide post-judgment relief to litigants
in a wide variety of circumstances spelled out in the text of both rules"3
and in case law interpreting their scope." This article, though, addresses a more narrow problem which is associated with both of these
rules: Can the trial court grant post-judgment relief for substantial ju-

dicial error in non-trial adjudications?1 5 On their face, both Rule 59
and Rule 60 appear to provide a post-judgment remedy to address judicial error in the trial court." In fact, they seem to overlap since both
are theoretically available to a litigant during the fourteen day period
immediately following the entry of final judgment.1" However, unlike
the filing of the Rule 59 motion for a new trial, 8 the filing of the Rule
60 motion to amend or vacate judgment does not suspend the running
of the thirty day statutory appeal period." More importantly, though,
Rule 60 has generally been held not to provide a remedy in the trial
court to cure substantive judicial error.2 0 As a result, the only post-

13. See supra note 4 for the text of OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B); supra note 5 for the text of
OHIO R. Civ. P. 59.
14. A discussion of the broad coverage of both OHIO R. Civ. P. 59 and OHIO R. CIv. P. 60 is
well beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed discussion of the grounds of these rules, see
generally 2 KLEIN, OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE 67, 100 (1988); 63 OHIO JUR. 3D, supra note 1, Judgments §§ 586-611 (1985); 40 OHIO JUR. 2D New Trial §§ 1-105 (1967).
15. For a discussion and definition of substantial judicial error, see infra note 125 and accompanying text.
16. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A)(9) specifically provides that a new trial can be ordered because
of "error of law occurring at the trial," and OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) specifies five grounds which
justify relief from judgment. See supra note 4. On its face OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) seems broad
enough to encompass relief from judgment for judicial error. However, Ohio case law suggests
otherwise. See infra notes 126 and 127 and accompanying text.
17. See supra notes 9 and 10.
18. The filing of a motion for new trial pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 59 suspends the running
of the thirty day statutory appeal period established by OHIO R. App. P. 4(A). See infra note 133.
19. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
20. Under pre-rule practice, it was generally held that judicial error was to be addressed on
appeal and was not a basis to vacate the judgment pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2325.01
(Anderson 1981), repealed by OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B); see also Bartlett v. Bartlett, 176 Ohio St.
299, 301, 199 N.E.2d 586, 588 (1964).
Of course, historically a trial court had absolute discretion to effect its own judgments for any
reason during term. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. Current OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) has
generally been interpreted not to be a substitute for appeal. Thus, a OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion
must set forth one of the grounds enumerated in the Rule and not grounds that should have been
the basis for an appeal. Waspe v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 27 Ohio App. 3d 13, 17, 499 N.E.2d 337,
341 (1985); Ruper v. Smith, 12 Ohio App. 3d 44, 46, 465 N.E.2d 927, 929 (1983); see also infra
note 126. There is, however, case law to the contrary. See Madison v. Curry, 323 N.E.2d 719, 720
(Ohio Ct. App. 1975); Buckman v. Goldblatt, 39 Ohio App. 2d 1, 2, 314 N.E.2d 188, 189 (1974);
Blank v. Snyder, 33 Ohio Misc. 67, 70 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1972). In addition, one appellate court has interpreted subsection five of OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) as granting power as broad as
that held by trial courts at common law to vacate or amend judgments during term. Matson v.
Marks, 32 Ohio App. 2d 319, 322, 291 N.E.2d 491, 494 (1972). Under the federal practice, the
issue is not altogether clear. The circuits have taken various approaches concerning whether judicial error can be corrected under analogous FED. R. Civ. P. 60(B). See infra note 127.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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judgment remedy immediately available to a litigant in the trial court
to correct substantial judicial error is the Rule 59 motion for a new
trial.
Despite its limitations, the importance of the Rule 60(B) motion
should not be minimized. The Rule 60(B) motion provides the only
remedy in the trial court for the litigant seeking relief from a final
judgment after the expiration of the thirty day statutory appeal pe-

riod."

While the grounds for vacating a judgment pursuant to Rule

60(B) are varied, 2 the primary purpose of the rule is clear. By providing a remedy to vacate final judgments, the Rule attempts to insure
fundamental fairness to litigants while simultaneously protecting the

principle of the finality of judgments.2 3

Significantly, for purposes of this article, neither Rule 60 itself nor
judicial interpretation of the Rule condition its application to judg-

ments entered as a result of a particular manner of adjudication. The
Rule makes no distinction among the various methods of adjudication
that precede the final entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 58.24 Instead,
a litigant's right to relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B) depends solely on his ability to show that the requirements of Rule 60
have been met.
Litigants seeking post-trial relief pursuant to Rule 59 face more
stringent requirements. The motion for new trial seeks to reopen the

21. The motion for a new trial must be filed within fourteen days from the entry of final
judgment. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(B). In the absence of the availability of collateral attack, see supra
note 1, a litigant's only recourse is the OHIo R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion.
22. See supra note 4 for the text of OHIO R. Civ. P. 60.
23. See Mount Olive Baptist Church v. Pipkins Paint & Home Improvement Center, 64
Ohio App. 2d 285, 287, 413 N.E.2d 850, 853-54 (1979); Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Novak, 53
Ohio App. 2d 289, 292, 373 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1977).
24. Generally the nature or character of a judgment does not affect a court's power to
vacate a judgment. OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) requires only that the relief sought be from a "final
judgment, order or proceeding." See generally Browne, The Finalityof an Order Granting a Rule
60(B) Motion for Relief from Judgment: Some Footnotes to GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v.
ARC Industries, Inc., 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 13, 88 (1977). Thus, a litigant could seek OHIO R. Civ.
P. 60(B) relief from a final judgment entered by defendant pursuant to OHIo R. Civ. P. 55. See.
e.g., Rafalski v. Oates, 17 Ohio App. 3d 65, 67, 477 N.E.2d 1212, 1214-15 (1984); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Deskins, 16 Ohio App. 3d 132, 134, 474 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (1984);
Antonopolous v. Eisner, 30 Ohio App. 2d 187, 190, 284 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1972). Also a litigant
could seek OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) relief from a confessed judgment. See, e.g., Knox County Bank
v. Doty, 9 Ohio St. 505, 506 (1859); Walcutt v. City of Columbus, I Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225 (Franklin County C.P. 1903). Similarly, a litigant could seek relief from judgment entered following an
adversary hearing, judgment after trial, judgment entered pursuant to summary judgment. and
judgment entered pursuant to other case dispositive motions. See, e.g., Peterson v. Teodosio, 34
Ohio St. 2d 161, 164, 297 N.E.2d 113, 114 (1973); Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Witterson,
32 Ohio App. 2d 227, 228, 289 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1972). See generally Browne, supra, at 24-132
(discussing in detail the various procedural contexts in which the OHfo R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion
may be by
raised).
Published
eCommons, 1988
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factual or legal issues in a case so that those issues can be retried or
reconsidered by the court which initially rendered the decision and entered final judgment.2 5 Whether initiated sua sponte by the trial court
or by motion of a party,2 6 the grant of a new trial allows the trial court
to correct any significant procedural or substantive errors which may
have occurred during the course of its original adjudication.27 Recent
judicial interpretations of Rule 59 have clearly settled that in Ohio a
motion for new trial will lie only after an actual trial of the factual
issues in a case. 28 Unlike the Rule 60 motion, the new trial device is
only available to a party (and the court) following a trial on the merits,
after a judgment is entered on a directed verdict pursuant to Rule
50(A) or, provisionally, after a court has entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(B). 29
Although the purpose underlying the Rule 59 motion for a new
trial also suggests the need for an equivalent procedural mechanism
allowing the trial court to self-correct error in any judgment it has rendered, 0 that is not currently the case in Ohio as it is under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." By narrowly limiting the scope of the new
trial motion and by refusing to recognize the existence of a motion for
reconsideration, 2 Ohio courts have interpreted the Ohio Rules in a
manner that creates a significant gap in the Rules' coverage. While a
litigant (and a court) can resort to the new trial device to remedy substantial judicial error in judgments rendered as a result of trial,"3 no
analogous device is available to a party (or the court) to remedy substantial judicial errors in final judgments rendered in non-trial adjudications. 3 ' Specifically, under the current Ohio practice, judicial adjudicatory error which results in the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 12
or Rule 56 cannot be corrected by the trial court once the decision is
considered final pursuant to Rule 58. In that circumstance, the litigant
has no remedy other than to appeal within the thirty day statutory ap-

25. The theory which underlies the rule is that the second adjudication will take place in an
environment more conducive to a just determination. See Rippel v. Rippel, 328 N.E.2d 816, 820
(Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
26. OHio R. Civ. P. 59(D) provides that "not later than fourteen days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have
been granted on motion of a party." Orno R. Civ. P. 59(A) provides that "[a] new trial may be
granted for all or any of the parties ...."
27. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes. 157-64 and accompanying text.
29. id.
30. See infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
34. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
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peal period. Unfortunately, this result flies in the face of a number of
policies underlying our modern system of procedure."a
This article addresses the current gap in Ohio's procedural landscape. It begins with a brief general review of the common law and
pre-rules practice concerning a trial court's review of its own final judgments. It then examines the judicial decisions interpreting the Ohio
Rules in a manner that effectively eliminates the trial court's opportunity to review its own final judgments in any adjudicatory context except trial. Finally, it considers a modest proposal to eliminate this gap
in the current Rules.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S GENERAL COMMON LAW POWER TO
VACATE OR MODIFY ITS OWN FINAL JUDGMENTS

A.

Early Ohio Practice

At common law in Ohio, after the entry of a final judgment, a trial
judge had extremely broad plenary powers to modify his own final
judgments at any time during the same term in which they were entered. 30 Historically, the in-term/out-of-term distinction 37 was extremely significant with respect to the court's ability to affect its own
judgments and was highlighted as early as 1854:
The Court of Common Pleas has ample control over its own orders and
judgments during the term at which they were rendered, and the power
to vacate or modify them in its discretion. But this discretion ends with
the term, and no such discretion exists at a subsequent term of court. 8
In term, a trial court's power was virtually unlimited, subject only
to review for an abuse of its discretion.3 " Pursuant to that power, a trial
court could correct or amend a judgment due to clerical errors or omis-

35. See infra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
36. Huntington & McIntyre v. W. M. Finch & Co., 3 Ohio St. 445, 447 (1854); see also
First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 120, 122, 130 N.E. 502, 503 (1921); Huber Mfg. Co. v.
Sweny, 57 Ohio St. 169, 174, 48 N.E. 879, 881 (1897); Knox County Bank v. Doty, 9 Ohio St.
505, 507 (1859); State ex rel Marzluf v. Beightler, 57 N.E.2d 180, 180 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980);
Harbine v. Davis, 57 N.E.2d 421, 421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944); Thompson v. Stonom, 57 N.E.2d 788,
788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); Davis v. Teachner, 53 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); Rabb v.
Board of Comm'rs of Cuyahoga County, 36 Ohio App. 481, 482, 173 N.E. 255, 256 (1930); Horwitz v. Murri, 24 Ohio App. 109, 110, 156 N.E. 420, 420 (1927); Willy v. Lewis, 6 Ohio Dec. 242,
243 (Hamilton County C.P. 1897). See generally 63-64 OHIO JUR. 3D, supra note 1, Judgments
§§ 548-730 (1985).
37. "Term" is defined as the space of time during which a court holds a session. Sometimes
the term is monthly, and other times it is a quarterly period. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1318
(5th ed. 1979). In this context, a court term extends until the beginning of the succeeding term at
least in the absence of an earlier adjournment. Miglierero v. State, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 44, 46 (Ct.
App. 1930).
38. Huntington & McIntyre v. W. M. Finch & Co., 3 Ohio St. 445, 448 (1854).
Published
eCommons,
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sions.' 0 It could also vacate a default judgment or judgment by confession to allow a defendant to mount a defense. "1 This discretionary
power was so broad that a trial court could vacate a judgment for no
reason at all so long as no abuse of discretion was evident on the face
of the record."2 Significantly, though, this power was not limited to correcting clerical errors or omissions"' or to vacating default or confessed
judgments." The power of a trial court over its own judgments during
term also extended to its ability to modify and correct erroneous decisions made in the course of its adjudication. "5
In the development of Ohio jurisprudence, a trial court's broad
and relatively unfettered powers to affect its own judgments in term did
not go unchallenged. Early Ohio statutes specifically limited a trial
court's power to affect its own judgments outside of term.'" The precursor statutes to the current Rule 60 spelled out with particularity which
powers a trial court retained over its own judgments after the expiration of term.' Although applicable on their face only to the amend-

40. Pursuant to the trial court's inherent power over its own judgments in term, see cases
cited supra note 36, a court can correct its own records during term. See generally 80 OHIO JUR.
3D, supra note 1, Records § 36.
41. See Knox County Bank v. Doty, 9 Ohio St. 506, 511 (1859); Huntington, 3 Ohio St. 445
at 448.
42. See, e.g., Davis v. Teachnor, 53 N.E.2d 208, 209 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
43. See supra note 40.
44. See supra note 41.
45. See Huntington & McIntyre v. W. M. Finch & Co., 3 Ohio St. 445, 448 (1854).
46. The earliest such statute was REVISED LAWS OF OHIO § 5354 (0. Aldrich 1884), which
provided how and on what grounds an order could be vacated after term. See Thatcher v. Dickinson, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 82, 84-5 (1888). Section 5354 was the precursor to OHIO GEN. CODE §
11631 (Anderson 1938) which, like § 5354, limited a court's power to vacate and amend its judgments after term to those grounds set out in the body of the statute.
47. OHIO GEN. CODE § 11631 authorized a trial court to vacate or modify a judgment or
order after term for the following reasons:
(1)By granting a new trial of the cause, within the time and in the manner provided
in § 11580.
(2) By a new trial granted in proceedings against defendants constructively summoned
as provided in § 11296.
(3) For mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or ordeir.
(4) For fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining a judgment or order.
(5) For erroneous proceedings against an infant or person of unsound mind, when the
condition of such defendant does not appear in the record, nor the error in the proceedings.
(6) For the death of one of the parties before the judgment in the action.
(7) For unavoidable casualty or misfortune, preventing the party from prosecuting or
defending.
(8) For errors in a judgment, shown by an infant within twelve months after arriving
at full age as prescribed in § 11603.
(9) For taking judgments upon warrants of attorney for more than was due the plaintiff, when the defendant was not summoned or otherwise legally notified of the time and
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
place of taking such judgment.
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ment or alteration of judgments outside of term, a number of Ohio
appellate courts interpreted the adoption of these statutes as evidence
of a legislative intent to limit a trial court's power to affect its judg-

ments in term."8
For example, in City of Cincinnati v. Archiable,49 the Court of
Appeals for Hamilton County found that the provisions of section
11637 of the General Code, 50 which prohibited a trial court from vacating a judgment in the absence of a valid defense on the merits, also

operated as a significant limitation on a trial court's power in term.5
The court went on to hold that a trial court had no discretion to set
aside a default judgment in the term in which it was entered, without
first requiring the defendant to show the existence of a valid defense as
specified by section 11637.52
Faced with conflicting appellate court decisions concerning the
meaning and effect of these early statutes, 5a the Ohio Supreme Court
addressed the issue squarely in 1921 in First NationalBank v. Smith.54
In that case, the supreme court held that an Ohio trial court of general
jurisdiction had control over its own orders and judgments during the
same term in which they were rendered, limited only by the exercise of
sound discretion. In reaching this decision, the supreme court charac-

(10) When such judgment or order was obtained, in whole or in a material part, by
false testimony on the part of the successful party, or any witness in his behalf, which
ordinary prudence could not have anticipated or guarded against, and the guilty party has
been convicted.
48. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Archiable, 4 Ohio App. 218, 227 (1915); Metzger v. Zeissler, 13
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 49, 52 (Wood County C.P. 1912); Smead Foundry Co. v. Chesbrough, 18 Ohio
C.C. 783, 785-86 (1895).
49. 4 Ohio App. 218 (1915).
50. OHIO GEN. CODE § 11637 provided that "A judgment shall not be vacated on motion or
petition until it is adjudged that there is a valid defense to the action in which the judgment was
rendered ....
51. The Archiable court observed:
Now it is undoubtedly the law of the state that a court, during the term at which a judgment or decree is rendered, has inherent power and authority, regardless of the statutes,
under the rules of the common law, to set aside or modify its judgments and decrees.
Nowhere under our code is this wholesome rule abrogated but the rule has been qualified
by § 11637, Gen. Code (formerly § 5360, Revised Statutes), and to the extent that a
limitation or qualification is provided under the code we are of the opinion that the courts
are bound by the qualification to the rule.
Archiable, 4 Ohio App. at 218.
52. Id. at 226. The Archiable court also noted:
Now we see no good reason why the limitation upon the court setting aside its judgment
during the term should not apply under Section 11637 to the same extent as to actions to
set them aside after the term, so far as requiring the defendant to show a valid defense.
Id.
53. First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 120, 130 N.E. 502 (1921), was certified to the
Ohio Supreme Court as being in direct conflict with Archiable, 4 Ohio App. at 218.
54. by102
Ohio St. 120,1988
130 N.E. 502 (1921).
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terized a trial court's power to affect its own judgments as an "inherent
power" founded in the common law."' In addition, the supreme court

noted that a trial court's power over its own judgments in term was
broader than the statutory power to affect judgments out of term." In
the absence of a specific rule of court to the contrary, the supreme

court specifically declined to limit a trial court's power to affect its own
judgments in term to the powers outlined in section 11631.11
The supreme court's decision in First National Bank eliminated

all doubts concerning the continued power of a trial court to affect its
own judgments in term. As long as the action was taken in term, a trial
court had the inherent common law power to suspend or alter a judg-

ment for any of the statutory grounds contained in section 11631 and
for "any other reason within the exercise of sound discretion. '58 The
effect of this decision is noteworthy: Even after the adoption of legislation specifically delineating the scope of a trial court's power to modify
or vacate its own judgments after term, a trial court's common law
power to affect its own judgments in term remained unchecked except
59
in cases of clear abuse of discretion.
The breadth of a trial court's inherent common law power to con-

trol its own judgments in term is exemplified by an 1897 decision by
the Ohio Supreme Court in Huber Manufacturing Co. v. Sweny.Y The

55. Id. at 122, 130 N.E. at 503 (citing Huntington & McIntyre v. W. M. Finch & Co., 3
Ohio St. 445 (1854)); see also Huber Mfg. Co. v. Sweny, 57 Ohio St. 169, 173-75, 48 N.E. 879,
880-81 (1897); Knox County Bank v. Doty, 9 Ohio St. 505, 508-09 (1859).
56. The court in First National stated:
There appears to be no limitation or restriction to the rule except that the power must be
exercised with sound discretion-limited only to cases in which there is an abuse of discretion. It follows, therefore, that the court, in the instant case, had the power to suspend the
judgment upon any ground enumerated in Section 11631 General Code, or for any-other
reason within the exercise of sound discretion.
First Nat'l Bank, 102 Ohio St. at 122-23, 130 N.E. at 503 (emphasis added).
57. The First National court also indicated:
[W]e are constrained to hold that in the face of such a rule the court may not be limited or
concluded to the grounds enumerated in Section 11631, General Code; and in the absence
of such a rule of court, the court may not be limited or concluded by the method of procedure outlined in Chapter 6.
Id. at 123, 130 N.E. at 503.
58. Id.
59. See supra note 56. It is important to note that historically, a trial court's common law
power to control its own judgments in term was related to but distinct from its power to grant a
new trial. Ohio courts had inherent power to set aside a verdict during term to grant a new trial in
the interest of justice. See, e.g., Grosser v. Armett Alloys, Inc., 70 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 164 (Ct.
App. 1953); Maimone v. Maimone, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 572-73 (Ct. App. 1949). However, a
denial of a properly filed new trial motion did not preclude the trial court from exercising its
inherent power to vacate or amend its judgment during term including the power to reconsider
and amend its denial of the new trial motion. Huber Mfg. Co. v. Sweny, 57 Ohio St. 169, 171-72,
48 N.E. 879, 880-81 (1897).
60. 57 Ohio St. 169, 48 N.E. 879 (1897).
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case was originally initiated in probate court by Frank Brandon, as assignee for the benefit of the creditors of James Sweny, asking for an
order fixing the priority of liens and distributing the proceeds of sales
made by him of certain assigned chattels. The action was then tried in
the Common Pleas Court of Warren County at its October Term, 1884
and final judgment was entered for the defendant, Huber, adjudging its
claim as the first lien and ordering distribution accordingly. Clara
Sweny, who objected to the court's finding concerning the priority of
liens, filed a motion for new trial within three days of the entry of final
judgment, but her motion was promptly overruled by the trial court.
Subsequent to the denial of the new trial motion but still during the
October term, Clara Sweny filed a motion to vacate and set aside the
final judgment. This time the trial court granted the relief that she
requested. It vacated its original judgment and simultaneously entered
judgment in favor of Clara Sweny. Having determined that Clara
Sweny had the first lien and that Huber had only second priority, the
court changed the order of distribution. Huber excepted and filed a
writ of error, but the circuit court affirmed the decision in Clara
Sweny's favor. Huber then sought a reversal of both judgments in the
Ohio Supreme Court.
In upholding the lower court decisions, the supreme court found
that the trial court had the inherent power to vacate and modify its
own judgments in term."1 The supreme court did not treat the motion
to vacate and amend the final judgment as a motion for a new trial.
Instead, it viewed the motion as an application for a rehearing of the
original motion for a new trial and for a rehearing of the merits of the
action:
[T]aking the entry as a whole, it shows that there was an application by
counsel for Mrs. Sweny, at the October Term, after the entry of judgment against her and the overruling of her motion for a new trial, to set
aside the order overruling the motion, for a vacation of the entry of judgment, and a rehearing of the cause itself, and that this application was
entertained; and it is fully apparent that the prayer for an order setting
aside the entry overruling the motion was then granted, and the cause
fully argued by counsel and submitted . . . and the effect of the subsequent order . . . was to sustain the motion and grant a new trial, or at

61. Id. at 173-74, 48 N.E. at 880-81. The Huber court observed:
That the court had power to do this is, we think, without question. It is stated in the
opinion in Harrington v. Finch, 3 Ohio St. 445 that: "The court of common pleas has
ample control over its own order and judgment during the term at which they are rendered,
and the power to vacate or modify them in its discretion. . . . Whether or not there might
be exceptions to it we need not inquire, for it is enough to say that the facts of this case do
not disclose any ground for such exception."
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least a rehearing, for it was a question of law, and not of fact, which was
involved.6 2
This ruling was significant for a number of reasons. First, it
lengthened to the end of a term the court's power to grant a new trial,
since, assuming the timely filing of a new trial motion, the trial court
retained the inherent power to reconsider and rehear the new trial
question until the end of term.6 3 In addition, and perhaps more significantly, although the motion was titled as a motion to vacate the original judgment, the supreme court treated the post-judgment request for
relief in the trial court as a motion asking the trial court to reconsider
its prior denial of the new trial motion. In so doing, the supreme court
distinguished between the initial motion for a new trial and the subsequent motion asking for a reconsideration or rehearing of the trial
court's disposition of the initial new trial request." The language of the
opinion further distinguishes between a reconsideration of the denial of
a post-judgment motion and a reconsideration and rehearing of the
"cause itself."6 5
The effect of the decision was clear. The supreme court not only
recognized a distinction between the motion for a new trial and the
motion to reconsider, but also specifically condoned the use of the motion to reconsider as part of the inherent power of a trial court over its
own judgments in term 6 Although the decision contains no discussion
of the grounds necessary to vacate and reconsider the final judgment
itself or to deny the new trial motion, the omission seems appropriate in
light of the broad discretion inherent in the trial court to vacate or
amend its own judgments in term. 7
B.

Current Practice Under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure

Though not apparent at first blush, the passage of the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1970 proved to have a significant impact on the
manner in which a trial court controlled its own judgments at common

62. Id.
63. At the time of the court's decision, the application for a new trial motion had to be
made "within three days after the verdict or decision is rendered." OHIO GEN. CODE § 11578. The
ruling gave litigants successive bites at the same apple until the end of the term in which judgment was rendered.
64. The Huber court also noted:
The application was not a motion for a new trial; that motion had already been passed
upon. It was an application for a re-hearing of the motion for a new trial. That is, the court
was asked to vacate the order overruling that motion, and to rehear the case . . ..
Huber, 57 Ohio St. at 173, 48 N.E. at 880-81.
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 61.
67. See supra notes 55 & 60 and accompanying text.
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law" and under the pre-rules statutes.6 9 The Rules specifically provide

for relief from final judgment in three ways: (1) a Rule 59 motion requesting a new trial;7" (2) a Rule 60(B) motion which seeks relief from

final judgment; 1 and (3) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict pursuant to Rule 50(B).7 2 Shortly after the adoption of the
Rules in 1970, two related issues emerged concerning the manner in

which parties could obtain post-judgment relief in the trial court. The
first concerned whether the procedural devices available to a litigant
seeking relief from final judgment are limited only to those enumerated
in the text of the newly adopted procedural rules. The second focused
on the effect, if any, that the adoption of the Rules had on a trial

court's inherent common law power over its own judgments in term.73
1. The Rules' Limiting Effect-The Motion for Reconsideration
The first of these two procedural issues facing the Ohio courts subsequent to the adoption of the Rules was whether a litigant could seek

relief from final judgment in a manner other than that specifically enumerated in the Rules. Ohio courts answered the question with a resounding no. 7 ' As a result, litigants seeking relief from a final judgment
are currently limited solely to the procedural mechanisms set out in the
75
body of the Rules.

Litigants raised the issue in Ohio appellate courts in two related
circumstances. After the passage of the Rules in 1970, some litigants
seeking relief from final judgment seemed confused over the manner in
which they could proceed. As a result of this confusion, some of those
aggrieved parties sought relief from adverse final judgments by requesting merely that courts "reconsider" their prior final judgments. 76 These

68. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 5 for text of OHIo R. Civ. P. 59.
71. See supra note 4 for text of OHio R. Civ. P. 60.
72. Like the new trial motion, the motion requesting judgment notwithstanding the verdict
must be filed within fourteen days after the entry of judgment. OHIO R. Civ. P. 50 (B).
73. For a discussion of a trial court's inherent common law power over its own judgments,
see supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
75. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure identify three procedural devices by which a litigant
can seek relief from final judgment-the motion for new trial pursuant to OHIo R. Civ. P. 59,
motions to alter, amend or vacate a judgment pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 60, and a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 50(B).
76. It is important to distinguish the context in which the "motion for reconsideration" is
used. This article is concerned with the reconsideration motion as a procedural mechanism to
request relief from final judgment. The motions for rehearing or reconsideration are not authorized by the current Rules nor were they authorized by the earlier procedural statutes. However,
historically these motions were used successfully by litigants who sought relief from final judgment pursuant
to a trial court's
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litigants often resorted to a procedural device known as a "motion for
reconsideration, 7 7 a motion notably absent from mention in the newly
adopted Rules. In these cases, the courts of Ohio were called upon to
determine the efficacy of this common law motion for reconsideration.
Though it was raised in a slightly different context after the passage of the Rules in 1970, the motion for reconsideration was not a new
problem for the Ohio courts. Both before and after the passage of the
Rules, the courts of Ohio grappled with the legitimacy of the motion
for reconsideration filed by litigants seeking relief from an adverse final
judgment. 78 With some exceptions, 79 after the adoption of the Rules in

After the adoption of the Rules in 1970, Ohio courts have generally not been receptive to the
motion. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
However, a trial court does have the inherent power to reconsider its own interlocutory orders. LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 275-76, 182 N.E.2d 632, 634 (1962). The motion
for reconsideration is the proper vehicle to invoke that power even though the motion is not specifically authorized by the Civil Rules. See Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 379
n.1,
423 N.E.2d 1105, 1106 n.1 (1981) (motion for reconsideration is the proper procedural device
to obtain relief from an interlocutory order); Browne, Local Rules of Court, 13 AKRON L. REV.
277, 313 n.136 (1979) [hereinafter Local Rules]; Browne, The FatalPause-Summary Judgment
and the Motion for Reconsideration, 44 CLEV. B.J. 7, 7 (1972) [hereinafter FatalPause]; see also
LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 275-76, 182 N.E.2d 632, 634 (1974). In LaBarbera,a
pre-rules case in which the court specified the proper use of the motion for reconsideration, the
court stated:
There is no provision in the procedural statutes of Ohio (dealing with trial courts), providing for a "rehearing" or "reconsideration" or an order, judgment or decree of a trial court
... A practice has grown up whereby these terms have been applied to requests for
reconsideration of interlocutory orders which may be entertained at the discretion of the
court, but such motions are not provided for by statute or otherwise, except in some instances, perhaps by rule of court, where such a motion is filed, which because of the entry
to which it is directed, is not a judgment decree or appealable order.
Id.
Of course, this same principle applies to judicial decisions any time up to their journalization.
Williams v. Bolding, 6 Ohio App. 3d 48, 49, 452 N.E.2d 1346, 1348 (1982). See generally 2
KLEIN, supra note 14, at 17.
77. The so-called "motion for reconsideration" is not in technical sense, the same as the
motion for rehearing. Neither is authorized by the Rules nor were they specifically referenced in
the pre-rules statutes governing the procedures of Ohio courts. While the two are frequently used
interchangeably, see Local Rules. supra note 76, at 313 n. 136, they do have distinct functions. The
motion for rehearing (functionally analogous to the motion for new trial) seeks a new hearing on
the matter in dispute while a request for reconsideration asks for judicial reconsideration without
a rehearing of the matter. Id; see also 2 KLEIN, supra note 14, at 13.
78. See, e.g., Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 381, 423 N.E.2d 1105,
1107 (1981) (motion for reconsideration of a final judgment in the trial court is a nullity); Bond v.
Airway Dev. Corp., 54 Ohio St. 2d 363, 365, 377 N.E.2d 988, 989 (1978); State ex rel Pajetska v.
Faulhaber, 50 Ohio St. 2d 41, 42, 362 N.E.2d 263, 263-64 (1977); Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio
St. 2d 265, 267, 313 N.E.2d 797, 798 (1974) (motion for reconsideration does not toll the time
pursuant to OHIO R. App. P. 4(A) within which to file an appeal from a final judgment); Suttle v.
Webster, No. 371, slip op. at 3 (Meigs County Ct. App. June 30, 1986) (motion for reconsideration can be treated in substance as a new trial motion); Sakian v. Taylor, 18 Ohio App. 3d 62, 63,
480 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1984) (motion for reconsideration a nullity); Ditmars v. Ditmars, 16 Ohio
App. 3d 174, 176, 475 N.E.2d 164, 165 (1984); Taylor v. Dixon, 8 Ohio App. 3d 161, 164, 456
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1970, Ohio courts have not been receptive to the use of the motion
primarily because it creates difficult problems in relation to Rule 4(A)
of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure and the running of the thirty
day statutory period within which to file a notice of appeal from a final
judgment, and because it is not specifically authorized by the Ohio
Civil Rules."0
While some appellate courts in Ohio strained to equate the motion
for reconsideration with another of the authorized post-judgment motions to preserve a litigant's appeal rights,"1 most Ohio courts flatly refused to recognize the motion for reconsideration as an appropriate procedural device to seek relief from final judgment.8 " The issue was
finally addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court
5 in 1981 in the case of
Pitts v. Ohio Department of Transportation."
The supreme court began its analysis in Pitts by noting the limiting language of Rule 60(B), which states that the "procedure for ob-

N.E.2d 558, 562 (1982) (motion for reconsideration is a nullity), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848
(1983); Taray v. Sadoff, 331 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); North Royalton Educ. Ass'n
v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 211, 325 N.E.2d 901, 904 (1974) (motion
for reconsideration treated in substance as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
new trial motion); Vavrina v. Greczanik, 40 Ohio App. 2d 129, 133, 318 N.E.2d 408, 412 (1974)
(motion for reconsideration will not toll the time for filing an appeal pursuant to OHIO R. APP. P.
4(A)); LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 275, 182 N.E.2d 632, 634 (1962) (pre-rules case
which specifies the proper use of the motion for reconsideration); Sarchet v. Bunn, 161 N.E.2d 56,
59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (a motion to reconsider an order refusing to vacate a cognovit judgment
was a motion for a new trial). A few commentators have also addressed this broad issue. See
generally 2 KLEIN, supra note 14, at 13; Browne, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Comment
on Amended House Bill 531, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 151, 198 n.182 (1976); Fatal Pause, supra
note 76, at 7; Local Rules, supra note 76, at 313 n.136; Kent, Odds and Ends, 49 CLEV. B.J. 280,
280 (1978).
79. See infra note 81.
80. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 78.
81. See, e.g., Suttle v. Webster, No. 371, slip op. at 3 (Meigs County Ct. App. June 30,
1986); North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209,
211-12, 325 N.E.2d 901, 904 (1974); Vavrina v. Greczanik, 40 Ohio App. 2d 129, 131, 318
N.E.2d 408, 412 (1974); LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 276, 182 N.E.2d 632, 634
(1962) (pre-rules case); Sarchet v. Bunn, 161 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). Professors
Klein and Browne have described these attempts to treat substance over form as the "conversion
exception." 2 KLEIN, supra note 14, at 19. As they correctly point out, the "exception" seems to
have little real viability in light of the supreme court's decision in Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Transp.,
67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Pitts v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 379-80, 423 N.E.2d 1105,
1106-07 (1981); Taylor v. Dixon, 8 Ohio App. 3d 161, 164, 456 N.E.2d 558, 561 (1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983).
83. 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981). As suggested in the text, the decision in
Pitts seems to lay the issue to rest. However, Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St. 3d 64,
448 N.E.2d 1365 (1983), seems to signal a retreat from the principle announced in Pitts. Still, as
professors Klein and Browne suggest, "it is doubtful that the Supreme Court in any way intended
to overrule Pitts. More likely, it simply failed to grasp the problem with which it was dealing." 2
KLEIN, supra note 14, at 15-16 n.13.
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taining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules." 8' 4 The Rules specifically allow for relief from judgment in
three ways: (1) the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
pursuant to Rule 50(B); (2) the motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 59; and (3) the motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule
60(B). Considering the fact that the Rules conspicuously fail to refer to
the motion for reconsideration, the supreme court refused to sanction
its continued use and concluded that the motion was now a "nullity." 85
In addition to this analysis, the supreme court also focused on the
impact which the request for post-judgment relief might have upon the
tolling of the thirty day statutory appeal period. Rule 4(A) of the Ohio
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides a thirty day period from the
date of the entry of final judgment during which a notice of appeal
must be filed in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.86
This thirty day appeal period is mandatory and not subject to extension, except for the instances noted in the rule.87 Rule 4(A) of the Ohio
Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically provides that the filing of a
motion pursuant to Rule 50(B) or pursuant to Rule 59 suspends the
time for filing a notice of appeal until the trial court has considered the
merits of the motion. 88 However, it makes no reference to or exception
for a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, given the clear language of
Rule 4(A) of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court declined to read that rule so as to implicitly include the filing of a motion
for reconsideration as a means of tolling the running of the thirty day
statutory appeal period.89

84. Pitts, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 380, 423 N.E.2d at 1107 (citing OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B)).
85. Id.
86. See infra note 88.
87. Bond v. Airway Dev. Corp., 54 Ohio St. 2d 363, 365, 377 N.E.2d 988, 989 (1978);
State ex rel. Kotch v. DeGrab, 168 Ohio St. 506, 507, 156 N.E.2d 465, 466 (1959); see also
Bosco v. Euclid, 38 Ohio App. 2d 40, 43, 311 N.E.2d 870, 872-73 (1974).
88. OHIo R. App. P. 4(A) provides that:
The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is suspended as to all parties by a
timely motion filed in the trial court by any party pursuant to the Civil Rules hereafter
enumerated in this sentence, and the full time for appeal fixed by the subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of the last of any of the following
orders made upon a timely motion under such rules granting or denying a motion (1) for
judgment under Rule 50(B); (2) for a new trial under Rule 59 . ...
In addition, OHIO R. App. P. 4(A) provides that a motion to vacate or modify a judgment by
objections to a referee's report under OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(7) or OHIO Juv. R. 40(D)(7) also
tolls the running of the statutory appeal period.
89. The court described its unwillingness to infer the inclusion of the motion for reconsideration as part of the OHIO R. App. P. 4(A) scheme as consistent with prior expression of policy.
Pitts, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 380, 423 N.E.2d at 1107 (citing Bond v. Airway Dev. Corp., 54 Ohio St.
2d 363, 377 N.E.2d 988 (1978) and Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797
(1974)).
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The Ohio Supreme Court continued its analysis of the problem in

Pitts by noting that its decision not to recognize the motion for reconsideration was mandated and supported by what it termed "practical
considerations." 90 The court recognized the "procedural quagmire"
which faces courts when they try to elevate the motion for reconsidera-

tion to the status of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or a Rule 50(A)
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.9" Concerned with the
financial and manpower cost incurred by appellate courts trying to decipher form over substance, the court found that the complications sur-

rounding motions for reconsideration "can and should be avoided" and
concluded that the motion for reconsideration after final judgment is a
nullity and no more than a "legal fiction created by counsel." 9
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Pitts appears to rest most
significantly on its concern over the apparent confusion created when
litigants resort to the use of common law procedural devices not specifically authorized by the Rules. However, the court's focus on this problem seems somewhat misplaced. The real problem does not lie, as the
opinion suggests, in the elevation of substance over form, since that is
one of the primary policies underlying our modern rules of procedure.9
Nor are trial or appellate courts unfamiliar with or incapable of resolv-

90. Pitts, 67 Ohio St. at 381, 423 N.E.2d at 1107 ("Practical considerations also mandate
and support our determination herein.").
91. Id. The Pitts court noted:
Once again, this court as well as the lower courts are left in a procedural quagmire of
trying to elevate a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment to the status of a
motion for a new trial or as a motion for a directed verdict or the like. The courts have had
the arduous task of trying to inspect each and every motion for reconsideration which is
filed in the trial court after a final judgment, and try to decipher form over substance. This
is a costly procedure, both financially and in manual labor, which as in the present case,
results in a procedural morass which clouds the merits. Complications concerning the timeliness of appeal and whether the Court of Appeals is vested with jurisdiction when a motion
for reconsideration is filed after a final judgment can and should be avoided.
Id. (citations omitted). It is precisely this reasoning that suggests that those courts which have
read Pitts as leaving the door open to elevate substance over form, see, e.g., Suttle v. Webster,
No. 371, slip op. at 3 (Meigs County Ct. App. June 30, 1986), have misinterpreted the intent of
the Pitts decision.
92. Pitts, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 381, 423 N.E.2d at 1107.
93. OHIO R. Civ. P. 1(B) states that the Rules "shall be construed and applied to effect just
results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious
administration of justice." In discussing the importance of OHIO R. Civ. P. I(B), the staff notes
highlight that "emphasis is placed upon liberal construction rather than technical interpretation."
Rules Advisory Committee Staff Notes, OHIO REV. CODE ANN., OHIO R. Civ. P. Supplement 5
(Anderson 1981). A number of recent Ohio Supreme Court cases have emphasized the general
policy consideration which underlies OHIO R. Civ. P. 1(B). See, e.g., Huffman v. Hair Surgeon,
Inc., 19 Ohio St. 3d 83, 86, 482 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (1985); Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St. 3d
125, 129, 447 N.E.2d 104, 107 (1983); Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St. 2d 161, 175, 297 N.E.2d
113, 122
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ing issues that require the elevation of substance over form.94
Of the court's various concerns, the problem of whether and when
the motion for reconsideration tolls the running of the statutory appeals
period seems most compelling. Viewed solely from this perspective, the
court's decision not to recognize the motion for reconsideration is. defensible because it does inject consistency into a procedural area historically fraught with difficulty. But it does so without concern for or reference to the legitimate historical function of the motion for
reconsideration. 95 If, as the court suggests, the motion for reconsideration was no more than a legal fiction created by counsel, 96 it was nevertheless a fiction previously condoned and sanctioned by Ohio courts.
Regardless of how the right was invoked, historically Ohio courts had
recognized a trial court's inherent power to remedy legal errors by vacating and modifying its judgments during term.97 Unfortunately, in its
zeal to simplify post-judgment procedure after the adoption of the
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970, the Ohio Supreme Court failed to
consider whether the post-judgment motion for reconsideration serves a
legitimate function in the overall adjudicatory scheme. The remainder
of this article will consider this question in some detail.
2.

Residual Common Law Power

After the adoption of the Civil Rules in 1970, a second group of
litigants encountered problems in their attempt to obtain post-judgment
relief. Although these litigants used the procedural devices set out in
the Rules, they did so incorrectly. Having failed to invoke properly the
procedural remedies outlined in the Rules, these litigants then asked
the courts of Ohio to grant post-judgment relief pursuant to their in-

94. See cases cited supra note 81. The practice in the federal courts has been to look to
form over substance when dealing with post-trial motions that could implicate FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
See cases cited infra note 210.
95. See infra note 97.
96. Pitts, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 381, 423 N.E.2d at 1107. The Pitts court observed that "[tihe
application for a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment is simply a legal fiction created
by counsel, which has transcended into a confusing, clumsy and 'informal local practice.' " Id.
(citations omitted).
97. A review of the early case law concerning a trial court's inherent power over its own
judgments in term does not reveal a concern for the manner in which the post-judgment relief was
styled. Like its counterpart the "motion for rehearing," the "motion for reconsideration" was not
specifically authorized by the Ohio pre-rules statutes governing the procedures of Ohio courts. See
supra note 77. However, the motion for rehearing was an acceptable mechanism to invoke a trial
court's inherent power. See, e.g., Huber, 57 Ohio St. at 173-75, 48 N.E. at 880-81. Given the
breadth of a trial court's power to vacate or modify its own judgments in term, see supra notes
36-67 and accompanying text, the post-judgment motion for reconsideration would seem to have
been perfectly appropriate. In addition, it is important to note that the motion for reconsideration
is still appropriately used in seeking reconsideration of interlocutory orders. See supra note 76.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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herent common law power over judgments rendered during term. 98
The specific question of whether, following the adoption of the
Rules in 1970, a court retained any residual common law power over
its own judgments during term was first addressed in 1982 by the
Wayne County Court of Appeals. In the oft cited case of Cale Products, Inc. v. Orrville Bronze and Aluminum Co.,9 9 the court concluded
that the procedures set forth in the Rules provide the exclusive means
by which a trial court may vacate or modify a final judgment. The
court of appeals rejected the argument that a trial court's inherent
common law power to modify or vacate its own judgments during term
had survived the adoption of the Rules.1"0
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that the Ohio Supreme Court had-by adopting the Rules-eliminated the in-term/outof-term distinction that was so important in the common law and prerules procedural scheme. Rule 6(C) specifically mandates that the "existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a
court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action consistent
with these rules." 10 1 According to the court of appeals, the Rules were
meant to provide a unified and comprehensive procedural scheme "irrespective of the term of court. 10 2 Since the procedure for obtaining any
post-judgment relief must be by motion as prescribed in the rules, the
court was particularly concerned that if it were to recognize the continued existence of a trial court's common law power over its own judgments in term there might then be a resulting expansion of the trial
court's power beyond the end of the term: "It would be anomalous to
hold that an inherent discretionary power, no longer limited in duration
by the expiration of the term of court, remains viable outside of this
10 3
procedural framework."

98. See, e.g., Sperry v. Hlutke 19 Ohio App. 3d 156, 158, 483 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1984); Cale
Prods., Inc. v. Orrville Bronze & Aluminum Co., 8 Ohio App. 3d 375, 377-79, 457 N.E.2d 854,
856-58 (1982); Lakco Mortgage Co. v. Pihlblad, I Ohio App. 3d 67, 67, 439 N.E.2d 455, 455
(1981).
99. 8 Ohio App. 3d 375, 457 N.E.2d 854 (1982).
100. Id. at 377, 457 N.E.2d at 857.
101.
OHIO R. Civ. P. 6(c).
102. Cale Prods., 8 Ohio App. 3d at 377, 457 N.E.2d at 856.
103. Id. It is interesting to note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also eliminated
the common law in-term/out-of-term distinction. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(C) provided that the term of
court had no effect on the five limits set out in the Federal Rules. The 1946 amendment to FED. R.
Civ. P. 6(C) provided that the continued existence of the term of court gave no additional powers
to federal trial courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(C) was repealed when the Act of October 16, 1963, Pub.
L. No. 88-139, § 1, 77 Stat. 248, 248, 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 273, 273,
amended 28 U.S.C. § 138 (1982), to eliminate terms of court in federal courts. However, the
elimination of terms of court did not result in a reduction of a trial court's power to reconsider its
See infra note 217.
judgments
non-trial adjudication.
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In reaching its decision, the Wayne County Court of Appeals also
relied heavily on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in First National
Bank.10 4 There, the supreme court refused to limit the inherent common law power of a trial court over its own judgment during term,
despite the existence of pre-rules statutes which limited a trial court's
post-term power to vacate or modify its judgments to the grounds set
out in the statutes. 105 The supreme court's refusal to limit a trial
court's common law power in term was based in part upon the absence
of any clear legislative enactment governing a trial court's power in
term." 6 However, the supreme court indicated its willingness to alter
the common law rule in the face of clearly applicable legislation." 7 In
deciding the Cale Prods. case the Wayne County Court of Appeals
evidently considered the newly adopted Rules to be the kind of clear
legislative pronouncement that the supreme court had deemed absent
at the time of the First National Bank decision. The court of appeals
concluded that the only available procedural avenues open to a litigant
seeking relief from final judgment are those specifically enumerated in
the Rules. 0 8
Although the Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed the narrow
issue raised in Cale Prods., its reasoning in First National Bank 0 9 and
its holding in Pitts"' strongly suggest that it would similarly limit the
availability of relief from final judgment to those procedural devices
specifically set out in the Rules. The current state of the law in Ohio
now seems crystal clear. A litigant who seeks relief from judgment

104. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. In First National the court stated that "[in the absence of legislative enactment the
common law rule must apply, for it would be a strange anomaly indeed that a court given the
power to vacate its judgment after the term should have no power to vacate a judgment within or
at the same term." First Nat'l, 102 Ohio St. at 122, 130 N.E. at 503.
108. In Cale Prods. the court observed:
We cannot subscribe to the view that this inherent discretionary power, formerly recognized only during the term of court, has been extended ad infinitum by Civ. R. 6(e). An
assumption underlying these pre-rules opinions is that a unified statutory scheme governing
all modification of judgments would abrogate a court's power to vacate or modify its judgment without observing procedural formalities.
Cale Prods., 8 Ohio App. 3d at 378, 457 N.E.2d at 857. The court also went on to note that OHIO
R. Civ. P. 60(B) "provides 'the exclusive grounds . . .and the procedure which must be followed
for a court to vacate its own judgment.' " Cale Prods., 8 Ohio App. 3d at 378, 457 N.E.2d at
857-58 (quoting McCue v. Insurance Co., 61 Ohio App. 2d 101, 399 N.E.2d 127 (1979)); see also
Matson v. Marks, 32 Ohio App. 2d 319, 321-22, 291 N.E.2d 491, 494 (1972); Antonopoulos v.
Eisner, 30 Ohio App. 2d 187, 190, 284 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1972). The defendant in Cale Prods. did
not seek relief pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) nor was a new trial sought pursuant to OHIo R.
Civ. P. 59(A). Cale Prods., 8 Ohio App. 3d at 378-79, 457 N.E.2d at 857-58.
109. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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must do so pursuant to the procedural devices set out in the Rules and

cannot seek relief from judgment pursuant to a trial court's inherent
common law power to control its own judgments in term.111 In Ohio
courts may no longer elevate substance over form when they are con-

fronted with a motion for post-judgment relief-at least in so far as
any such motion implicates Rule 4(A) of the Ohio Rules of Appellate
Procedure and affects the thirty day time period for filing a notice of
appeal from the entry of final judgment. 1 2
III.

RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS FOR JUDICIAL ERROR UNDER
THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.

Generally
The prior section focused briefly on the remedies generally availa-

ble to a litigant seeking relief from final judgment in the Ohio courts.
Yet, as previously noted, parties can and do seek relief from final judg-

ment for various reasons under a variety of circumstances. 1 3 The primary focus of this article is not on these broad and expansive sets of
circumstances. Rather, this article is concerned primarily with a rela-

tively narrow issue-the availability of relief from final judgment for
judicial error in cases of non-trial adjudication. 1 4 Before examining
this issue in more detail, though, we will first take a brief look at the
remedies generally available to those who seek relief from judgment for
judicial error.

1. Judicial Oversight or Omission
Rule 60(A) allows a court to correct clerical mistakes in judg-

ments or other errors arising from a court's oversight or omission."

5

The errors correctable pursuant to Rule 60(A) are referred to in the
remainder of this article as judicial "clerical" error. 1 6 The power to

S111.
OHIo R. Civ. P. 59 and OHlo R. Civ. P. 60(A) and (B) provide the exclusive means by
which a litigant may seek post-judgment relief. Of course, as noted previously a trial court is
always free to alter, amend or vacate an interlocutory order. See supra note 76.
112. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
114. In this article, the reference to "non-trial adjudication" means the entry of a final
judgment pursuant to either OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(c) or OHIO R. Civ. P.
56.
115. OHIo R. Civ. P. 60(A) provides:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with
leave of the appellate court.
116.byOHio
R. Civ. P.1988
60(A) is generally applied only to inadvertent clerical error. These
Published
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correct these judicial clerical errors in a judgment are broad and can
be invoked upon motion of a party or by the court any time on its own
initiative.11 7 The purpose underlying Rule 60(A) is clear. A court
should have relatively unrestricted power to correct clerical errors in its
own judgment in the interests of justice to insure that the judgment
entered and journalized actually reflects the true intent of the trial

court in finding in favor of one party over another.11
It is equally clear, however, that judicial errors of a more substantial or serious nature are not included within the scope of Rule
60(A) 19 and are not as easily remedied. 2 0 When the final journalized
judgment accurately reflects the intent of the trial court, even if it is
otherwise an erroneous judgment, relief will not lie pursuant to Rule
2
60(A).' '

As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this article, the text of
Rule 60(A) makes no distinction between mistakes made in trial adjudications as opposed to those made in non-trial adjudications.' 2 2 Cleri-

errors are usually mechanical in nature and apparent on the face of the record. Dentsply Int'l, Inc.
v. Kostas, 26 Ohio App. 3d 116, 118, 498 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (1985). In addition, OHIO R. Civ. P.
60(A) does not authorize the modification of an erroneous judgment but rather is intended to
remedy errors of a clerical nature which prohibit the record from reflecting the actual intent of
the court. Dentsply. 26 Ohio App. 3d at 118, 498 N.E.2d at 1081. See generally 62 OHIo JUR. 3D,
supra note 1, Judgments § 77 (1985). Prior to the enactment of the Rules in 1970, Ohio courts
similarly limited their common law power to correct their own records to clerical error and omissions which subverted the actual intent of the trial courts. While a court had the power to correct
error to insure that the judgment actually reflected the intent of the court, there was no power to
change a judgment to reflect a decision different from that which the court actually intended. In
re Farkash, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 137, 141-43 (1909); see also 62 OHIO JUR. 3D, supra note 1,
Judgments § 75 (1985).
117. See supra note 115.
118. See supra note 116.
119. OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(A) is meant to apply to clerical errors only and cannot be used to
change that which was deliberately done. Dentsply Int'l, Inc. v. Kostas, 26 Ohio App. 3d 116, 118,
498 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (1985). Clerical errors involve only those errors which are mechanical in
nature and involve no judgment or decision. Id. Likewise, errors of law made by a court in the
course of an adjudication are not remediable pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(A). See Elias v. Ford
Motor Co., 743 F.2d 463, 466 (1st Cir. 1984); Holcomb v. United States, 622 F.2d 937, 943-44
(7th Cir. 1980); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, 136 F.2d 771, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See generally 6a J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.06[4] (2d ed.
1988).
120. Errors of a more substantial nature do not fall within the scope of OHIO R. Civ. P.
60(A), see supra note 119, and instead must be corrected by appeal, an OHIO R. Civ. P. 59
motion for a new trial, or an OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion, if appropriate, see infra note 127.
121. See supra note 119. When the court's oversight or omission affects the substantial
rights of the parties, the judicial error is also beyond the reach of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(A). See
Mechanical Technology Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir. 1985); In
re Galiardi, 745 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1984); Mullins v. Nickel Plate Mining Co., 691 F.2d 971,
973-74 (11th Cir. 1982).
122. Neither the language of the Rule itself nor court decision limits the reach of OHIO R.
Civ. P. 60(A) to mistakes or errors in judgments following trial. See supra note 115 for text of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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cal mistakes, errors of oversight, or omissions made in judgments entered after trial also fall within the scope of the Rule as well as those

that are made in the entry of judgment or final orders following nontrial adjudications. 12 3 The rule is intended to insure that the final judgment or order accurately reflects the intent of the trial court regardless
of the manner in which the matter was originally adjudicated or decided.' 2 4 It will be demonstrated, however, that this is not the case with
respect to those substantial judicial errors that fall outside the scope of
Rule 60(A). The nature of the judicial error is a significant factor in

determining whether and in what manner a trial court can self-correct
that error.
2.

Substantial Judicial Error

In Ohio it is well settled that a litigant who seeks to obtain relief
from a final judgment due to substantial judicial error2 cannot do so
pursuant to subsection (A) of Rule 60.126 Although there is some support for the notion that subsection (B) of that rule may be used to
remedy substantial judicial error in very narrow circumstances,' 2 7 there

OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(A). Federal courts have not limited the application of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(A)
relief to judgments entered subsequent to trial. See, e.g., In re Jee, 799 F.2d 532, 533-34 (9th Cir.
1986) (Rule 60(A) motion properly used to correct a final order dismissing a cross claim), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987); Panama Processes v. Cities Serv. Co., 789 F.2d 991, 993-94 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Rule 60(A) motion granted to clarify the meaning of a consent judgment); United
States v. Stewart, 392 F.2d 60, 62 (3d Cir. 1968) (Rule 60(A) used to amend judgment by confession); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Figurine Salon of Cal., Inc., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1426, 1427 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Rule 60(A) relief granted to vacate a default judgment).
123. See cases cited supra note 122.
124. See supra notes 116 and 122.
125. When the term "substantial" judicial error is used in this article it refers to those
errors which are prejudicial and involve substantial error of law from which an appeal would
normally lie.
126. See supra note 119. However, FED. R. Civ. P. 60(A) relief has been granted in a few
cases described by Professor Moore in his treatise as "questionable." 6a J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G.
GROTHEER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 119, T 60.06[4]; see Blaine v. Peters, 194
F.2d 887, 887 (D.C. Cir..1952); Ex parte Wright, 8 F.R.D. 358, 358 (N.D. Cal. 1948); In re
Harbor Stores Corp., 33 F. Supp. 360, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
127. OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B)(1) authorizes relief from judgment or order for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." There has been some question concerning whether judicial error that results in the entry of an erroneous judgment falls within the language of OHIO R.
Civ. P. 60(B)(1) as a "mistake." While Ohio case law suggests that it does not, see supra note 20,
the analogous Federal Rule has been interpreted by some federal circuit courts to include judicial
error as a "mistake" within the meaning of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(1). See Page v. Schweiker, 786
F.2d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1986); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
1982). However, other circuits refuse to include judicial error within the scope of FED. R. Civ. P.
60(B)(1). See Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir. 1984); McKnight v. United
States Steel Corp., 726 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1984). This split in the circuits is discussed generally at 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 119, 1
60.22[3].
In Ohio
there is some 1988
support for the proposition that OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B)(5) could provide
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are insurmountable practical problems that limit its usefulness.1 28 An
aggrieved party is always free to pursue an appeal to correct substan-

tial judicial error but that alternative is both lengthy and costly. As a
result, the most viable remedy available to a litigant who seeks immediate relief from a final order or judgment for judicial error in the trial
court is the motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.129
Rule 59 provides that a new trial can be granted to all or any of
the parties to an action on all or part of the issues previously heard
either upon the motion of a party or upon the initiative of the court.13 0
In addition, the Rule provides that a new trial motion is not limited to

actions tried to a jury. Subsection (A) specifically authorizes a court to
entertain a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury and
further allows a "court [to] open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions'of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and enter a new judgment.""' ' The motion can be filed at any time within fourteen days of
the entry of final judgment' 2 and pursuant to Rule 4(A) of the Ohio
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the filing of the motion for a new trial
suspends the running of the thirty day statutory appeal period until the
trial court disposes of the new trial motion.'

a post-judgment procedural mechanism to cure judicial error. See Matson v. Marks, 32 Ohio App.
2d 319, 327, 291 N.E.2d 491, 497 (1972) (Rule 60(B)(5) gives a court power as broad as that at
common law to vacate a judgment during term). Despite the possible applicability of OHIO R. Civ.
P. 60(B) to cure judicial error, the prudent practitioner should avoid the use of OHIo R. Civ. P.
60(B) to remedy judicial error. See infra note 143 and accompanying text; see also supra note 20.
128. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. The text of OHIo R. Civ. P. 59 sets out nine grounds for the grant of a new trial. See
supra note 5 for the text of OHIo R. Civ. P. 59. In addition to the nine enumerated grounds, Rule
59 specifically authorizes the grant of a new trial "in the sound discretion of the court for good
cause shown." OHIo R. Civ. P. 59.
131. OHfo R. Civ. P. 59(A) provides that "[o]n a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and
enter a new judgment." (emphasis added).
132. OHIo R. Civ. P. 59(B) provides that "[a] motion for a new trial shall be served not
later than fourteen days after the entry of 'judgment.' " This fourteen day period is mandatory
and not subject to extension. Town & Country Drive-In Shopping Centers, Inc. v. Abraham, 46
Ohio App. 2d 262, 348 N.E.2d 741 (1975); see also Gribble v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1173, 1174 (5th
Cir. 1980); Tobriner v. Chefer, 335 F.2d 281, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
133. OHIo R. App. P. 4(A) provides that "the running of the time for filing a notice of
appeal is suspended as to all parties by a timely motion filed in the trial court by any party
pursuant to the Civil Rules hereafter enumerated in the sentence . . .(2) for a new trial under
Ohio R. Civ. P. 59 .... " See, e.g., Bond & Assocs. v. Airway Dev. Corp., 54 Ohio St. 2d 363,
364, 377 N.E.2d 988, 989 (1978) (statutory appeal period of OHIo R. App. P. 4(A) tolled by filing
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59). However, filing an OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion
does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Colley v. Bazell, 64 Ohio St. 2d 243, 244, 416
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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The primary object of the new trial device is to provide a rehearing in the trial court of questions previously heard by that court but
which were improperly decided."" For the litigant who feels that a
court has committed an error of law in its adjudicative deliberations,
the Rule 59 motion provides a procedural remedy that enables that
litigant to have a trial court review the issue without the added time
and expense of filing an appeal. 3 ' The new trial device is the appropriate mechanism by which a trial court can correct egregious error
brought to its attention subsequent to the entry of final judgment. In
addition, the device also allows a court, in the absence of a motion, to
self-correct previous decisions which the court in its own judgment determines were erroneous."'
B.

The ProceduralScheme-The Dilemma

For any litigant seeking to have a trial court correct judicial clerical error, oversight or omission, the choice is simple-the Rule 60(A)
motion.137 As previously noted, there is no time limitation on when a
court can correct this type of error, except, of course, when an appeal
has been taken and is pending. 1 38 Nor is a litigant's ability to obtain
this relief related to the manner in which the court concluded its adjudication.13 9 In contrast, the litigant who seeks relief from final judgment for substantial judicial error faces a number of procedural pitfalls
depending on the nature of the adjudication which preceded the entry
of final judgment.
For the litigant who seeks relief from judgment for substantial judicial error after there has been a full trial on the merits, the choice is
not problematic. The Rule 59 motion requesting a new trial is the appropriate vehicle to seek relief from a final judgment where there has
been substantial judicial error during the course of the trial."" Regardless of the ultimate disposition of the motion, the litigant is without risk
for having filed the motion because the statutory appeal period is tolled

134. See Rippel v. Rippel, 69 Ohio Op. 2d 503, 504 (Ct. App. 1974); Manchester v. Cleveland Trust Co., 95 Ohio App. 201, 208, 114 N.E.2d 242, 249 (1953).
135. See Sanders v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 21 Ohio App. 3d 249, 252, 487 N.E.2d 588, 590
(1985) (court may grant a new trial when it determines that it committed an error of law during
the course of the original trial).
136. Omo R. Civ. P. 59(D) provides that within the fourteen day period immediately following the entry of judgment, the court "of its own initiative may order a new trial for any
reasons for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party.
... See, e.g., Musca
v. Village of Chagrin Falls, 3 Ohio App. 3d 192, 195, 444 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1981).
137. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 115.
139. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See supra note1988
135 and accompanying text.
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during the pendency of the motion."1 However, if no motion for a new
trial is filed, then the only realistic alternative to correct substantial
judicial error lies in an appeal to the appellate courts. While there is
some support for the proposition that Rule 60 can, in certain circumstances, be used to correct substantial judicial error," 2 the filing of a
Rule 60 motion will not suspend the running of the statutory appeal
period following the entry of a final judgment." 3 As a practical matter,
it is not likely that a trial court could consider and rule on a Rule 60
motion before the expiration of the thirty day statutory appeal period.
As a result, the Rule 60(B) motion is a futile gesture since an appeal
which will divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the motion"' 5
will have to be filed before the end of the thirty day appeal period.,
It is important to note that while the Rule 59 time limits have
been strictly construed"16 and while the interplay of Rules 59 and 60
can at times be problematic,"17 the Rules specifically provide a procedural mechanism for a trial court to correct substantial judicial errors
made during the trial process. However, there is currently no similar
procedural device that allows a trial court to correct substantial judicial
error following a judgment entered as a result of a non-trial adjudication. Thus, for example, following an entry of a judgment as a result of
a court's ruling on a successful motion for summary judgment, neither
the litigants nor the court can address substantial judicial error which
occurred during the course of the adjudication. No matter how clear or
how egregious, the only remedy lies in appellate court review. This
anomaly is the result of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Pitts v.

See supra note 133.
See supra note 125.
OHIO R. App. P. 4(A) provides that the statutory appeal period is tolled by the filing of
an OHIO R. Civ. P. 59 motion for a new trial, an OHIo R. Civ. P. 50(A) motion requesting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a motion to vacate or modify a judgment by objection to
a referee's report under OHIO R. Civ. P. 53(E)(7) or OHIO R. Juv. P. 40(D)(7). See Kauder v.
Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 267, 313 N.E.2d 797, 798 (1974); McCue v. Buckeye Union Ins.
Co., 61 Ohio App. 2d 101, 106, 399 N.E.2d 127, 130 (1979); Town and Country Drive-In Shopping Centers v. Abraham, 46 Ohio App. 2d 262, 267-68, 348 N.E.2d 741, 745 (1975); Bosco v.
City of Euclid, 38 Ohio App. 2d 40, 43-44, 311 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1974).
144. Vavrina v. Greczanik, 40 Ohio App. 2d 129, 132, 318 N.E.2d 408, 412 (1974) (trial
court has no jurisdiction to act on an OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment while
an appeal is pending).
145. OHIo R. App. P. 14(B) provides that a court may not enlarge or reduce the time for
filing a notice of appeal. When read in light of the Ohio Supreme Court's strict interpretation of
OHIO R. App. P. 4(A) in Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797 (1974), it would
appear that the statutory appeal period is not subject to expansion. See Metier, Kauder v. Kauder:
Strict Interpretation of Appellate Rule 4(A) and the Requirement for Suspending the Time for
Filing a Notice of Appeal, 2 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 387 (1974).
146. See supra note 132.
147. The difficulty stems from the possible overlap between OHIO R. Civ. P. 59 and OHIO R.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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141.
142.
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Ohio Department of Transportation," 8 eliminating the viability of the
motion for reconsideration coupled with a series of decisions narrowly
interpreting the scope of the new trial device.

C.

The ProceduralScheme-The Cases

Even before the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in
1970, the issue of whether the new trial motion applied to non-trial
adjudications was addressed by the Ohio appellate courts. In 1962,
some eight years prior to the adoption of the Rules, the Ohio Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County in LaBarbera v. Batsch1 49 considered
the question of whether a "motion for rehearing" filed after a grant of
summary judgment and well within the statutory period for filing a
motion for new trial should be considered by the trial court as a motion
for new trial pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2321.17, the precursor
statute to Rule 59.150 In that case the plaintiff-appellant took issue with
the decision of the trial court granting defendant-appellee's motion to
dismiss and the resulting judgment dismissing plaintiff's action. In finding that the "motion for rehearing" was the functional equivalent of a
motion for new trial, the appellate court approached the problem by
focusing on the nature of the relief requested in the motion and refused
to resolve the matter by elevating form over substance. The court
stated:
[Wihere a motion incorrectly designated as a motion for "rehearing" or
"reconsideration" in fact seeks relief within the purview of what, in substance, is a motion for new trial, as defined by statute, the court will
disregard such designation and consider such motion as if it had been
captioned as a motion for new trial. 5 '
148. 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981); see also supra note 83 and accompany.ing text.
149. 117 Ohio App. 273, 182 N.E.2d 632 (1962).
150. Id. at 275, 182 N.E.2d at 634. The characterization of the motion was crucial to the
outcome of the case. Plaintiff's "motion for rehearing" was denied by the trial court and plaintiff
then filed an appeal approximately forty three days after the entry of the original order dismissing
plaintiff's action. At that time, Orno REV. CODE § 2505.07 (the precursor statute to OHIo R. Civ.
P. 4(A)), required that a notice of appeal be filed within twenty days after the entry of the final
order or judgment except that "when a motion for new trial ... is filed by either party within the
time provided . . . then the time of perfecting the appeal does not begin to run, and an appeal
shall not be taken until the entry of the order overruling or sustaining . . . the motion for new
trial ....
" If plaintiff's "motion for rehearing" was considered as a new trial motion within the
meaning of § 2505.07, then plaintiff's appeal was tim-'y. Otherwise it was not and plaintiff had no
further recourse.
151. LaBarbera, 117 Ohio App. at 276, 182 N.E.2d at 634. In focusing on substance over
form, the appeals court relied in part on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State, ex rel. Smith
v. Young, 137 Ohio St. 319, 29 N.E.2d 564 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941) in which the
court treated a motion to strike as a demurrer. In that case, the supreme court recognized "the
rule thatby
ordinarily
a motion
to strike from a petition should not be treated as a demurrer." Id. at
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The appellate court in LaBarbera concluded that the motion for "rehearing" should have been considered as a motion for a new trial since
it sought a redetermination of certain issues of law as those legal issues
were reflected in the trial court's final judgment.1 52
Shortly after the adoption of the Rules, LaBarbera was followed
by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals' decision in North Royalton
Education Association v. North Royalton Board of Education.5 3 In
North Royalton, the appeals court again looked to the substance of the
appellant's motion for reconsideration to determine if it should be
treated as the equivalent of the motion for a new trial for the purpose
of suspending the running of the appeal period after the entry of final
judgment.1 54 While the reasoning of these two cases is consistent with
the underlying policy of the Rules155 and with the approach adopted by
the federal courts in addressing the same issue with respect to Rule 59

320, 29 N.E.2d at 565. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has not always adhered strictly to that
rule. Zajachuck v. Willard Storage Battery Co., 106 Ohio St. 538, 140 N.E. 405 (1922); Robinson
v. Fitch, 26 Ohio St. 659 (1875); Finch v. Finch, 10 Ohio St. 501 (1860).
152. The defendant in LaBarbera argued that the "motion for rehearing" should not be
considered as a new trial motion since the new trial device was restricted to redetermination of
factual issue only. As the court noted, the new trial device had historically been limited to redetermination of factual question by OHIO GEN. CODE § 11575 (Anderson 1938) which defined a new
trial as a "re-examination in the same court, of an issue of fact." However, in 1945 OHIO GEN.
CODE § 11575 (the precursor to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2321.17 (Anderson 1981)) was amended
to read "a re-examination in the same court, of the issue after a final order, judgment, or decree
by the Court." In addition, the LaBarbera court relied on OHIO REV. CODE § 2321.17(F) which
authorizes the grant of a new trial when the final order or judgment "is not sustained by sufficient
evidence, or is contrary to law." LaBarbera, 117 Ohio App. at 276, 182 N.E.2d at 634. Thus, the
supreme court thought it perfectly evident that plaintiff was seeking a new trial of the issue of law
previously determined as specifically authorized by OHIO REV. CODE § 2321.17(F). Id.
153. 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 325 N.E.2d 901 (1974).
154. The Cuyahoga County Appeals Court was mindful of the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797 (1974), which established the
principle that a motion for reconsideration is not the equivalent of a motion for new trial or a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and does not, therefore, toll the thirty day statutory appeal period pursuant to OHIO R. App. P. 4(A). Though bound by Kauder, the appeals court
did not read the supreme court's decision as precluding them from elevating substance over form:
We do not read either the Rules or Kauder as requiring the elevation of form over substance. Consequently, it is necessary to examine appellant's post-trial motion to determine
whether its substance requires that it be treated as a motion for reconsideration or as a
motion for new trial . . . . In our view appellant's "Application for Reconsideration" must
be treated as a motion for new trial under Civ. R. 59(A)7).
North Royalton, 41 Ohio App. 2d at 211, 325 N.E.2d at 904.
155. OHIO R. Civ. P. 1(B) requires that the rules "be construed and applied to effect just
results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious
administration of justice." As the staff notes make more explicit, emphasis in interpretation of the
rules is placed upon "liberal construction rather than upon technical interpretation." Rules Advisory Committee Staff Notes, OHIO REV. CODE ANN., OHIO R. Civ. P. Supplement 5 (Anderson
1981). The spirit of the Rules requires the resolution of cases on their merits, not upon technical
pleading deficiencies. Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St. 2d 161, 162, 297 N.E.2d 113, 114 (1973).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 156 neither case was subsequently followed in any other Ohio decision.
In 1979, the Ohio Court of Appeals for Montgomery County addressed the same issue in a slightly different manner in the case of
57
Shearson, Hayden & Stone, Inc. v. Steiner.1
In that case, the trial
court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on November
22, 1978. There was little question that the entry of judgment was a
final appealable order within the meaning of the Civil Rules.' 58 However, instead of filing an appeal, the defendant filed a motion for a
"new trial, new hearing, in accordance with Civil Rule 59 and for reconsideration of the Court's Decision."' 59 Though generally sympathetic to the substance over form argument advanced in both
LaBarbera and North Royalton, the appellate court found the reasoning of its sister courts applicable only to a mislabeled motion after trial:
We agree that the substance rather than the label controls the nature of
a request to the court. Thus, after a trial is conducted a motion mistakenly labeled may be considered a motion for a new trial. Here, the nature of the request when there was no. trial does not support such
consideration.'"0
The absence of a trial and entry of final judgment pursuant to a Rule
56 motion for summary judgment was obviously a significant factor
which influenced the court in its refusal to treat the motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial. The court's opinion notes that

156. In the federal courts, the characterization of post-judgment motions has also been a
problem. However, the solution has been different from that adopted by the Ohio courts. Not
unlike the Ohio courts, some federal courts have chided counsel for not being clearer in their
characterization of post-judgment relief. See, e.g., Bank of Calif. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 709
F.2d 1174, 1176 (7th Cir. 1983). In the face of continued ambiguity, many circuit courts have
taken a liberal approach to post-judgment motions and have adopted a rule that all substantive
motions challenging the correctness of a judgment that are served within ten days after the entry
of judgment (the time required for filing a motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 59) will be treated
as a FED. R. Civ. P. 59 motion, and will, therefore, toll the statutory time for filing an appeal. See,
e.g., Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); Rankin v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985); Venable v.
Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1983). Other circuits, without adopting a per se rule, look
to the substance of the motion and not to how the motion is labeled. See, e.g., Lyell Theatre Corp.
v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1982); Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir.
1978); Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'ns, 537 F.2d 1058, 1061
(9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 454 U.S. 1070 (1981).
157. 66 Ohio App. 2d 10, 418 N.E.2d 1389 (1979).
158. The last paragraph of the trial court's judgment reads: "This order is intended as a
Final Order from which an appeal may be taken." Id. at 10, 418 N.E.2d at 1389.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 13, 418 N.E.2d at 1391. The quote is originally from Carpenter v. Lipker, No.
6443, slip op. at (Montgomery County Ct. App. Aug. 17, 1979), a case that addressed the
same issue as that raised in Shearson. The Montgomery County Appeals Court opinion in Shearson citesby
approvingly
to its1988
prior decision in Carpenter and adopts the reasoning set out there.
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Ohio case law has always distinguished between a trial and a hearing
on a motion for summary judgment. 6 1 In the court's view it made little
sense to allow a "new trial" when there had been no trial originally.
The judges reasoned that to allow a Rule 59 motion for a new trial
following the entry of final judgment on a motion for summary judgment would undercut that method of adjudication." 2 Since summary
judgment is rendered only in the absence of disputed fact "any motion
for relief is for reconsideration of the law and not for a new trial and
not for the rehearing of the facts."'6 3
The appellate court based its decision on the premise that the motion for a new trial is a mechanism to retry or rehear only the facts of a
case and is not intended to serve as a means to reconsider questions of
law. Since summary judgment is appropriate only in the absence of
disputed fact, the court concluded that to allow a rehearing of the
"facts" is both illogical and inappropriate. The flaw in the court's conclusion lies in its premise that the new trial device is not available to
remedy errors of law made in the course of the original adjudication.
While early Ohio case law limited the availability of the new trial device to cure factual errors only, recent case law makes it clear that the
64
motion can be used to remedy errors of law as well as factual errors.
In 1981 the Ohio Supreme Court finally considered the issue in

In arriving at this conclusion, the appeals court relied on a number of authorities:
It has been held that inasmuch as a summary judgment proceeding is not a "trial," a
summary judgment may not be attacked by motion for a new trial. 73 American Jurisprudence 2d 768, Summary Judgment, § 40.
161.

Thus, summary judgment procedure is a method for the proper disposition of actions
in which there is no genuine issue as to a material fact. Such procedure is not to be regarded as a trial, but instead as a proceeding for the determination of whether or not there
is a genuine issue to be tried. 32 A Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 410, 412, Judgments, § 885.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has spoken on the question thusly: "It is important to
remember that a summary judgment proceeding is not a trial, but a hearing upon a motion." Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 15 Ohio St. 2d 184, 185, 239 N.E.2d 94, 95
(1968).
Shearson, 66 Ohio App. 2d at 12, 418 N.E.2d at 1390.
162. Quoting from its own opinion in Carpenter v. Lipker, No. 6443 (Montgomery County
Ct. App. Aug. 17, 1979), the Shearson court discussed the importance of the distinction between
trial and summary adjudication:
Here there was no trial and it is a fiction to ask for a new one. The issue in summary
judgment is one of law based upon the absence of a disputed fact .... If additional facts
could be submitted, this would destroy the schedule and procedure for submission under
the summary judgment rule. Requests for relief to the trial court from a summary judgment fall within a discretionary area of further review of the law and such requests, however labeled, do not effect the finality of the judgment rendered.
Shearson, 66 Ohio App. 2d at 12, 418 N.E.2d at 1390.
163. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
164. See infra note 187.
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L.A. & D., Inc. v. Board of Lake County Commissioners16 5 and
reached a conclusion similar to that reached by the Montgomery
County Court of Appeals, citing the Shearson166 opinion with approval.
In L.A. & D., the plaintiff brought suit against the Board of Lake
County Commissioners and the Board responded by filing a motion to
dismiss or, alternatively, to grant summary judgment. On July 31,
1979, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. On August 14, 1979, the plaintiff moved for a new trial within
the allowable period for filing new trial motions. The trial court subsequently denied the motion for new trial on October 19, 1979 and plaintiff appealed from the denial of the motion for new trial on October 30,
1979. No appeal was ever taken from the summary judgment entered
on July 31, 1979.
The court of appeals sua sponte raised the issue concerning
whether it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the summary judgment where no appeal from that judgment had been filed. They answered the question in the negative and thereby affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. The record was then certified to the supreme court,
and that court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.
Appellant's argument to the Ohio Supreme Court was simple and
straightforward. Since the filing of the motion for new trial suspends
the statutory thirty day appeal period,' 6 7 the appeal from the denial of
the motion for new trial was filed within the applicable time period for
filing an appeal from the final entry of summary judgment. However,
according to the supreme court, the flaw in appellant's argument was
equally simple: "appellant's argument is engulfed in the belief that a
summary judgment proceeding is a trial and that the logical procedural
flow would allow a motion for a new trial after a summary judgment
had been rendered."' 6 8 Since summary judgment was a final determination of the rights between the parties and the motion for new trial
was not appropriate, the appellant's notice of appeal had to be filed
within thirty days of the entry of that final judgment. 6 9

165. 67 Ohio St. 2d 384, 423 N.E.2d 1109 (1981).
166. See supra note 157.
167. OHfo R. App. P. 4(A)i provides that the filing of a motion for new trial suspends the
thirty day statutory appeal period until the motion is decided by the trial court. See supra note 88.
168. L.A. & D., 67 Ohio St. 2d at 386, 423 N.E.2d at 1111.
169. In L.A. & D., the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
In the instant cause, the summary judgment as granted was a final determination of the
rights of the parties and, therefore, ripe for appeal at that time. Yet, no timely appeal was
taken from the summary judgment, in accordance with App. R. 4(A), which states that the
notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the date of the entry of judgment or order
appealed from.
423 N.E.2d1988
at 1111.
Id. at 386-87,
Published
by eCommons,

68

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:1

The supreme court's conclusion was based in part on a narrow def-

inition of what constitutes a trial within the contemplation of Rule 59.
Like the Ohio Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, the supreme
court narrowly construed the scope of the Rule 59 motion for new trial.
According to the supreme court, Ohio case law has always indicated

that a summary judgment proceeding is "not a trial but rather is a
hearing upon a motion." 17 0 Because of that distinction, a new trial is

appropriate only following a trial and not after a hearing on a motion.
The court concluded by holding that the "motion for a new trial which
questions the granting of a summary judgment is a nullity and not
proper."' 1
Unlike the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, the supreme court did not treat the issue in L.A. & D. as a question of policy
under the Rules concerning the elevation of substance over form.
Rather, the court addressed the substantive scope of the new trial motion pursuant to Rule 59 and concluded that the propriety of a motion
for a new trial after entry of summary judgment followed somewhat
logically, though erroneously, from a narrow characterization of the
issue. 7'
There is no question that a hearing on a motion for summary judgment is not a trial, at least as we commonly understand the term. 7
The summary judgment hearing, if one is held, is in the nature of an
appellate oral argument which addresses two questions-are there gen-

uine issues of material fact, and if not, is judgment for the moving
party appropriate as a matter of law.' 7 4 In contrast, the prime focus of
170. Id. at 387, 423 N.E.2d at 1112 (citing Morris v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 15
Ohio St. 2d 184, 239 N.E.2d 94 (1968) and Trustees v. McClannahan, 53 Ohio St. 403, 42 N.E.
34 (1895)).
171. The L.A. & D. court ruled that "(slince a summary judgment proceeding is not a trial,
a motion for a new trial does not properly lie." L.A. & D., 67 Ohio St. 2d at 387, 423 N.E.2d at
1111.
172. Id. Commentators have reached similar results based on similar reasoning. See, e.g.,
Fatal Pause, supra note 76, at 7. In 1982 the supreme court extended its holding in L.A. & D., to
include a motion for a reconsideration of dismissal of a petition for post conviction relief. State ex
rel. Batten v. Reece, 70 Ohio St. 2d 246, 248, 436 N.E.2d 1027, 1028 (1982). The trial/hearing
distinction was also the basis for the Montgomery County Court of Appeals decision in the case of
Brown v. Coffman, 13 Ohio App. 3d 168, 468 N.E.2d 790 (1983). There, the court held that a
judgment rendered upon a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 60(A) could
not be the basis for a motion for new trial since the hearing conducted on the motion was not a
trial within the meaning of OHIO R. Civ. P. 59. Id. at 170, 468 N.E.2d at 791. The court found
that "[ain examination of the grounds for a new trial under Civ. R. 59(A) suggests that the
drafter of the rule contemplated the term 'trial' in its conventional sense .
Id. See generally
I..."
Carroll, The Meaning of the Term "'Trial"Within the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 515 (1976).
173. See supra note 161.
174. The supreme court's articulation of the distinction in L.A. & D., is correct. A motion
for summary judgment pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 56 seeks a "paper" adjudication because there
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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a trial is the presentation of evidence and the determination and resolution of factual issues.
However, the supreme court's narrow focus on the technical distinction between a hearing on a motion and a trial on the merits misses
the more important question, which is whether the motion for a new
trial (or its functional equivalent) after a summary judgment serves a
legitimate purpose in the overall adjudicatory scheme. The answer to
this more fundamental question requires an analysis of the functional
similarities between adjudication by trial and adjudication by summary
judgment (and other non-trial adjudication) as well as a consideration
of the underlying purpose of the new trial device. Unfortunately, the
court addressed neither issue and instead relied on a very narrow,
mechanical analysis of the definition of the word "trial" within the
Rule 59 context.
Before addressing these two issues in more depth, it is important
to note that while the holding in L.A. & D., applies only to a motion for
a new trial filed after a grant of motion for summary judgment, the
reasoning which underlies the decision appears to apply equally to all
non-trial adjudication which results in the entry of final judgment. A
final disposition of an action after a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(C) is no more a "trial" in a technical sense
than is a summary judgment adjudication pursuant to Rule 56.75
When coupled with the court's decision in Pitts, which held the motion
for reconsideration a nullity,1 76 the L.A. & D. decision all but eliminates the possibility of trial court review of its own judicial error following the entry of final judgment except where a trial on the merits
precedes the entry of judgment. 7 7 There is currently no procedural device available to a litigant or to the court to address judicial error after
the entry of final judgment in a non-trial adjudication. This judicially
created procedural gap is both problematic and undesirable in light of
the policy which underlies the motion for new trial.

is an absence of disputed fact which makes a trial unnecessary. Thus, a "hearing" on a motion for
summary judgment, is in the nature of an appellate oral argument and does not involve the affirmative presentation of evidence normally involved in a trial. See Brown v. Coffman, 13 Ohio App.
3d 168, 169-70, 468 N.E.2d 790, 790-91 (1983) (discussing the trial/hearing distinction); see
also Fatal Pause, supra note 76, at 7.
175. See, e.g., Maumee Valley Physical Therapy v. Griffin, No. L-84-167, slip op. at (Lucas County Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1984) (denial of a motion for new trial appropriate following a
default judgment because there was no prior trial) (citing Shearson, Hayden & Stone Inc. v.
Steiner, 66 Ohio App. 2d 10, 418 N.E.2d 1389 (1979)).
176.

Pitts, 67 Ohio St. at 381, 423 N.E.2d at 1107.
2d at 387, 423 N.E.2d at 1111.
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Substantial Judicial Error as Grounds for a New Trial

Traditionally, the Rule 59 motion for a new trial has been available to cure a variety of errors occurring during the trial of a case. In

Ohio for example, new trials have been allowed where there have been

178 misconduct of a party, counsel
irregularities in the court proceeding;
or juror; 179 improper damages awarded as a result of passion or
181 or where there has
prejudice;1 80 error in the amount of the recovery;
82 Similarly, the current Rule specifibeen newly discovered evidence.1

cally authorizes the grant of a new trial in a number of circumstances. 83 While there was a period in the history of Ohio jurispru-

dence during which new trials were limited to re-examinations of issues
of fact,'18 4 it has been clear for years that a new trial can also lie where

178. For example, a prejudicial remark by a trial judge in the presence of the jury affords
grounds for a new trial. See, e.g., Brace v. Adam Hoffman Co., 29 Ohio L. Rptr. 205, 208 (Ct.
App. 1929); Hazen v. Morrison & Snodgrass Co., 14 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 483, 485 (1911). New trials
have been ordered where the judge instructed the jury on a matter of fact in the absence of
counsel. See, e.g., Seagrave v. Hall, 10 Ohio C.C. 395, 408 (1895). See generally 40 OHIO JUR.
2D, supra note 14, New Trial § 13-15 (1986).
179. Misconduct of a party was specifically identified in the early Ohio statutes as a
grounds for the grant of a new trial. See, e.g., OHIO GEN. CODE § 11576 (Anderson 1938) (repealed 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2321.17(B) (Anderson 1971) (repealed 1971); see also
Macci v. Aldred, 28 Ohio Op. 390, 392 (Mercer County C.P. 1944); Foreman v. Sandusky D. &
C. R.R., 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 611, 612 (Seneca County C.P. 1862). Misconduct of counsel was
not expressly mentioned in the early code provisions but nevertheless has been held to justify the
grant of a new trial. See, e.g., Jones v. Macedonia-Northfield Banking Co., 132 Ohio St. 341, 350,
7 N.E.2d 544, 548 (1937); General Convention v. Crocker, 7 Ohio C.C. 327, 337 (1893). The
early statutes specifically provided that a new trial shall be granted for irregularities in the proceedings of a jury. OHIO GEN. CODE § 11576; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2321.17(B); see also
Peart v. Jones, 159 Ohio St. 137, 144, 111 N.E.2d 16, 20 (1953); Philips v. Board of Educ., 21 Ohio
App. 194, 207, 153 N.E. 119, 123 (1924).
180. Early statutes provided for a new trial where the damages were excessive and were
given as the result of passion or prejudice. OHIO GEN. CODE § 11576; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2321.17(D). See, e.g., Chester Park Co. v. Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 278-89, 166 N.E. 186, 188
(1929); Klotz v. Balmat, 34 Ohio App. 490, 494-95, 171 N.E. 409, 411 (1930).
181. The early statutes authorize a new trial when there has been an error in the assessment
of the amount of controversy in contract actions and in actions for injury to or detention of property. OHIO GEN. CODE § 11576; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2321.17(E). See, e.g., National Milling
Co. v. Craft, 23 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 515, 517 (1912); Brock v. Becker, 8 Ohio Dec. Rptr. Reprint
263, 264-65 (Hamilton County Dist. Ct. 1881).
182. Newly discovered evidence is a specific enumerated ground contained in the early statutes outlining the grant of a new trial. OHIO GEN. CODE § 11576; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2321.17(G). See, e.g., Martin v. Mohn, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 118, 119 (Ct. App. 1963); Hauer v.
French Bros. Bauer Co., 36 Ohio L. Rptr. 51, 56 (Ct. App. 1931).
183. OHIo R. Civ. P. 59 specifies nine grounds for the grant of a new trial. See supra note 5
for a list of the enumerated grounds. In addition, the Rule also provides a "catch i11" which
outlines the grant of a new trial "in the sound discretion of the court for good cause shown."
184. At common law, the term "new trial" was used to mean a complete retrial of a cause
facts. See Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. v. Richter, 131 Ohio St. 433, 438, 3 N.E.2d 408, 410
the
on
(1936); Zaleski v. Clark, 45 Conn. 397, 403 (1877); Dodge v. Bell, 37 Minn. 382, -, 34 N.W.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
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there has been manifest error of law in a judgment. 185 Both the precursor statutes 186 and the current Rule 59181 contemplate that a motion for
a new trial can be employed to correct manifest errors of law.
Not only is the new trial device available to cure a wide variety of
judicial and non-judicial errors occurring in the adjudication of a case,

CODE § 11575 defined a new trial as a "re-examination, in the same court, of an issue of fact,
after a verdict by a jury," and the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted OHIO GEN. CODE § 11575 to

restrict new trials to a rehearing of the case from the beginning. Dayton & Union R.R. Co. v.
Dayton & Muncie Traction Co., 72 Ohio St. 429, 434, 74 N.E. 195, 196 (1904). Thus, for example, one court stated:
Prior to the amendment of Section 11601, General Code, a Court of Common Pleas lacked
power and authority, after verdict and on consideration of motion for a new trial, to enter
final judgment for the movant on theory that his motion for a directed verdict during trial
had been erroneously denied.
Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. v. Richter, 131 Ohio St. 433, 440, 3 N.E.2d 408, 411 (1936) (citations omitted). The court was limited to allowance of the motion for a new trial and the resulting
new trial. Id. at 439, 3 N.E.2d at 411; see also Edelstein v. Kidwell, 139 Ohio St. 595, 599, 41
N.E.2d 564, 566 (1942). Contra Levin v. Kiska, 54 Ohio App. 408, 412, 7 N.E.2d 666, 667-68
(1937); Lehman v. Harvey, 45 Ohio App. 215, 225, 187 N.E. 28, 32 (1933); Silver v. Thomas, 9
Ohio App. 187, 187 (1918). See generally Note, Rendition of Final Judgments by Trial Courts on
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or on Motion for New Trial, 9 U. CIN. L.
REV. 67, 73 (1935).
OHIO GEN. CODE § 11575 was amended, effective October 11, 1945, to change the definition
of a new trial to the "re-examination, in the same court, of all the issues." Act of June 28, 1945,
1945 Ohio Laws 366, 366. After that date, a new trial could -be employed for the purpose of reexamining issues of law as well as issues of fact. See, e.g., Manchester v. Cleveland ,Trust Co., 95
Ohio App. 201, 207, 114 N.E.2d 242, 246 (1953); Rosco v. Kolb, 93 Ohio App. 352, 356, 113
N.E.2d 746, 748 (1952); Ohio Motors Inc. v. Charlesworth, 88 Ohio App. 299, 301, 97 N.E.2d
686, 687 (1950); Duemer v. Duemer, 86 Ohio App. 192, 192, 88 N.E.2d 603, 604 (1949). OHio
REV. CODE ANN. § 2321.17 similarly defined new trials as a re-examination of both facts and law.
See Rismiller v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 129 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); Ohio
Motors Inc. v. Charlesworth, 88 Ohio App. 299, 300, 97 N.E.2d 686, 688 (1950); Duemer v.
Duemer, 86 Ohio App. 192, 192, 88 N.E.2d 603, 604 (1949). Like OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2321.17, current OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A) broadly defines new trial by authorizing a new trial "on
all or part of the issues."
185. As early as 1859, new trials were granted in Ohio for error of law occurring during the
trial of an action. See Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co., 10 Ohio St. 223, 226 (1859).
186. Ohio statutes have provided that a new trial could be granted for an "error of law
occurring at the trial." OHIO GEN. CODE § 11576; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2321.17(H); see, e.g.,
Dayton & Union R.R. Co. v. Dayton & Muncie Traction Co., 72 Ohio St. 429, 435, 74 N.E. 195,
196-97 (1904); Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co., 10 Ohio St. 223, 227 (1859). One such
legal error was the improper rejection or admission of evidence. See, e.g., Payne v. Vance, 103
Ohio St. 59, 78, 133 N.E. 85, 90 (1921); Sheree v. Piper, 26 Ohio St. 476, 480 (1875); Blackburn
v. Blackburn, 8 Ohio 81, 85 (1837); Industrial Comm'n v. Strassel, 11 Ohio App. 234, 236 (1919).
Errors in giving jury instructions were also included under these statutes. See, e.g., Herman v.
Teplitz, 113 Ohio St. 164, 168, 148 N.E. 641, 642 (1925); Burt v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co., 41 Ohio
St. 204, 205 (1884). Furthermore, refusing to direct a verdict constitutes legal error. See, e.g.,
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Johnston, 76 Ohio St. 119, 137, 81 N.E. 155, 160 (1907); Monfort
v. Ellis, 16 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 241 (Hamilton County C.P. 1913).
187. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59 by its express language authorizes a new trial where there have
been errors of law during the original adjudication. OHIO R. Civ. P. (59)(A)(9). Subsection 9
provides for a new trial where there has been "[e]rror of law occurring at the trial." See, e.g.,
Sandersby
v. eCommons,
Mount Sinai Hosp.,
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it is also available in both jury and non-jury actions.1 88 Rule 59 specifically provides that in actions tried without a jury, "the court may open
the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend

findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and enter a new judgment." ' The applicability of the new
trial device to both judge and jury trials is significant with respect to
the consequence of the grant of a new trial.
For example, in an action tried to a jury, the grant of a new trial
any
of the reasons enumerated in the Rule applicable to jury acfor
tions requires that the case actually be retried before a new jury. 90
However, in a bench trial a court has a great deal 'more flexibility. in
determining whether a new hearing is actually necessary following a
decision to grant a new trial.' 91 While this appears somewhat anoma-

188. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A) specifically provides for the grant of a new trial in non-jury
.-..
cases, "fo]n motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury."
189. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A).
190. For example, where there has been jury misconduct pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P.
59(A)(2) or where a jury awards excessive damages under the influence of passion or prejudice
pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A)(4) there is no question but that the matter must be retried in
front of a new jury. In jury trials generally, where there is a grant of a new trial pursuant to OHIO
R. Civ. P. 59(A) the case will be retried before a new jury. However, the opening sentence of
OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A) provides that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and
on all or part of the issues . . " As the commentary to OHIO R. Civ. P. 59 makes clear, this
language provides for a partial new trial even in jury actions, although partial new trials are rare
in jury actions. Staff notes, OHIo REV. CODE ANN., OHIO R. Civ. P. 59 (Anderson 1981). See
generally 6a J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & L. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 119,
59.06-07.
191. While there is no Ohio case law specifically discussing a trial court's power subsequent
to a grant of a new trial motion, the clear language of OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A) does not require
that a court rehear the case. Under the provisions of OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A) the trial court can
amend its findings of fact or conclusion of law or make new findings or conclusions and enter a
new judgment. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A). While the court may take "additional testimony," the
intent of the Rule is clear that something less than a new trial is acceptable. FED. R. Civ. P.
59(A), which contains the identical language as that of OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A), has been consistently interpreted not to require a retrial following the grant of a new trial. Thus, for example
when the only issue raised in the new trial motion is a legal question, a new trial may not be
necessary. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 210 F.2d 360, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding
that a new trial is not necessary when only a legal question is raised and that a court may reverse
the original judgment if the evidence taken at the original trial justifies it; however, if new evidence is revealed there should at least be a trial of those facts), affd in part and rev'd in part, 220
F.2d 593, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929 (1955); Davis v. West, 71 F. Supp. 377, 378 (W.D. Mo.
1947) (judgment can be modified without a new trial if all the evidence had been presented at the
original trial); see also DuPont v. United States, 385 F.2d 780, 784 (3d Cir. 1967); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 205 F. Supp. 893, 895 (E.D. La.), affd in part and rev'd in part, 308 F.2d
491 (1962); Ryans v. Blevins, 159 F. Supp. 234, 235 (D. Del.), aftd, 258 F.2d 945 (3d Cir. 1958).
However, when merely taking additional evidence or reviewing the record will not provide substantial justice a new trial may be necessary. See Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky, 47 F. Supp.
65 (W.D. Me. 1942); Folmer Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Serv., 45 F. Supp. 749, 750 (D.
Mass. 1942). See generally 6a J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAChttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
59.07; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
TICE, supra note 119,
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lous, it is very consistent with the purpose underlying the new trial device when used subsequent to bench trials.19 2 There is no question that
in some circumstances, a new trial would be necessary to cure the error
in the original bench trial. This is the case where, for example, the
grant of the new trial is the result of newly discovered evidence.1 9
In other circumstances, though, a new trial is not necessary because the prior judicial error can be remedied by something less time
consuming than a new trial. Under Rule 59(A) a court may, in a
judge-tried case, take additional testimony, amend findings and conclusions or make new findings or conclusions and enter a new judgment. 9 4
Although there is neither Ohio case law nor commentary on this particular section of Rule 59, the permissive language in the Rule seems to
contemplate that, like its federal counterpart, an Ohio trial court has
the freedom to remedy its error by something less than a full retrial of
the case.19 In addition, case law interpreting the analogous provision in
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrates that a
new trial is not always necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
rule. 96 This is the case primarily where the motion for the new trial
97
raises only questions of law.
Pursuant to the analogous Rule 59(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a federal district court can completely reverse a judgment following a bench trial where there has been a manifest error of
law and the evidence taken at the first trial supports the new judgment. "98
' So, too, where there has been a controlling decision rendered
since the entry of judgment, a district court can consider the new decision and reverse itself without a new trial if the new judgment is supported by the evidence presented at the original trial.' 99 It is equally
clear, however, that whenever the effect of the legal error is such that

2804 (1973).
192. An underlying purpose of the new trial device is to provide the trial court and litigants
with a procedural mechanism to correct error in the trial court without need to resort to the time
and expense of an appeal. Manchester v. Cleveland Trust Co., 95 Ohio App. 201, 207, 114 N.E.2d
242, 246 (1953).
193. When newly discovered evidence is the ground for the grant of the new trial, the trial
court must rehear that new evidence. Depending on the nature of the evidence, the whole case
may be retried or only a partial retrial held. See Mast v. Doctor's Hosp. North, 46 Ohio St. 2d
539, 541, 350 N.E.2d 429, 430 (1976); see also United States v. 63.04 Acres, 257 F.2d 68, 69 (2d
Cir. 1958); Folmer Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Serv., 45 F. Supp. 749, 750 (D. Mass. 1942).
194. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A).
195. See supra note 191.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Phelan v. Middle States Oil Co., 210 F.2d 360, 366 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 220 F.2d 593, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929 (1955).
199. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, 136 F.2d 771, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1943); In re
Tucker,by
148eCommons,
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justice is not done by merely reviewing the record in light of the error
then there should be a new trial or at least the taking of additional
evidence.20o
This very brief look at the new trial motion as it is used to remedy
errors of law following bench trials is significant for a number of reasons. The previously discussed Ohio Supreme Court decision in L.A. &
D., is premised on the distinction between a "hearing" and a "trial" for
the purpose of the applicability of Rule 59.201 As noted previously,
while there are obvious differences between hearings and trials primarily with respect to the presentation and handling of evidence, both
function identically when they result in the entry of final judgment.
While the manner of adjudication is different, full evidentiary trials on
the merits, Rule 56 motions, and Rule 12 motions are all procedural
mechanisms that allow a court to fully and finally adjudicate the rights
and liabilities of the parties to the litigation. When considered in light
of their common adjudicatory function, the Ohio Supreme Court's formalistic distinction--drawn for purposes of the applicability of Rule
59-fades.
Rule 59 is meant to provide a remedy in the trial court to correct
adjudicatory error in a variety of circumstances, one of which is to
remedy errors of law committed in the course of a trial judge's adjudication.20 2 That the substantial judicial error occurred during the course
of a full evidentiary trial rather than during the course of an adjudication by motion is of little real significance. Unlike jury error, errors of
law are not confined to jury trials. Judges can obviously commit legal
error during the course of a jury trial. However, they can commit those
same errors of law during bench trials and in their deliberations on
other potentially case dispositive motions. While some of those errors
are obviously unique to the particular adjudicatory mechanism employed, 2"' others are not.20 4

200. See supra note 191.
201. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 187.
203. For example, giving improper or refusing to give proper jury instructions is grounds for
a new trial. See Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co., 10 Ohio St. 223, 230 (1859). However,
these grounds are unique to a jury trial context.
204. The erroneous rejection or admission of evidence can be grounds for a new trial. OHIO
R. Civ. P. 59(A)(9); see also Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 78, 133 N.E. 85, 90 (1921);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Smith, 64 Ohio St. 106, 117, 59 N.E. 890, 892 (1901); Industrial
Comm. of Ohio v. Strassel, II Ohio App. 234, 235-36 (1919). In addition, a new trial is authorized where the judgment is contrary to law. OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A)(7). The "contrary to law"
language has been interpreted in a comprehensive manner to include any error of law committed
by the trial court. See Weaver v. Columbus, S. & H. Valley R.R., 55 Ohio St. 491, 494-95
(1896); Miller v. Miller, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 280, 285 (Ct. App. 1949). Judicial error of law occurs
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
in both jury and non-jury settings, and, if prejudicial, a new trial would be appropriate in either
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A closer look at the trial court's adjudicatory function in a bench
trial will help illuminate the problem. At the risk of oversimplification,
it is commonly understood that in a bench trial a judge performs three

basic operations. She sits like a jury and determines the facts after
sorting through the evidence. She then determines the applicable law
and finally adjudicates the dispute by "applying" the law to the facts as
determined. In this bench trial context, a Rule 59 motion is an appropriate procedural mechanism to remedy erroneous interpretations of
law and to correct erroneous applications of doctrine. This type of judicial error is not confined to bench trials and can occur as well in the
context of a case dispositive motion."0 5 In the absence of a particular
policy concern, 0° it would appear that a post adjudicatory remedy,
similar to that available after trial, should also be available after the
entry of judgment following a case dispositive motion.

context.
205. The federal courts have set out three grounds which generally support reconsideration
of a prior decision: (1) a change in the controlling law; (2) the discovery of new evidence; and (3)
to remedy manifest injustice. All Haw. Tours, Corp. v. Polynesian Cultural Center, 116 F.R.D.
645, 649 (D. Haw. 1987), rev'd, 855 F.2d 860 (1988); Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665-66 (E.D. Cal. 1986), affd in part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 514
(1987), cert. denied, 108A S. Ct. 1752 (interim ed. 1988). Motions for reconsideration can be
used in the federal courts to remedy judicial error. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d
438 (9th Cir. 1982). However, while the motion for reconsideration is appropriate to remedy judicial error made in the course of a summary judgment adjudication, a litigant cannot merely assert
new arguments that should have originally been made in response to or in support of the original
motion. Rudell v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 F.2d 926, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied. 480 U.S. 907, (1987); Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762
F.2d 557, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1985).
206. The only policy concern remotely identified in the Ohio cases restricting the scope of
OHIO R. Civ. P. concerns limiting post-judgment motions in non-trial adjudications because of
their frequency. The motion for reconsideration has often been used by litigants in circumstances
where an appeal is the proper procedural avenue to follow. In these instances, judicial energy is
often wasted in responding to frivolous motions. While this is certainly a legitimate policy concern,
the answer lies in developing clear standards which address when a motion for post-judgment
relief following a non-trial adjudication is appropriate. For example, in federal court a litigant has
no right to have a judgment "reconsidered" pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 59(E). See F/H Indus.,
Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 116 F.R.D. 224, 226 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("We stress that
losing parties are not entitled to a reconsideration of every ruling or judgment as a matter of right,
but must set forth legitimate reasons for the district court to change its initial ruling."). Generally, courts have articulated three major grounds to justify reconsideration: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct
clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.
1981); All Haw. Tours, Corp. v. Polynesian Cultural Center, 116 F.R.D. 645, 649 (D. Haw.
1987), rev'd, 855 F.2d 860 (1988); Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp.
656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), affid in part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 514 (1987), cert. denied,
108A S. Ct. 1752 (interim ed. 1988). When a litigant files a motion for reconsideration that is
frivolous, the appropriate remedy is sanctions pursuant to OHIO R. Civ. P. 11; see also All Haw.
Tours Corp., 116 F.R.D. at 650. Articulating clear standards and sanctioning offending parties
who file frivolous motions is a better approach than completely eliminating the availability of postjudgment
Published
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A second rationale for the restrictive interpretation of the Rule 59
motion is set out in the Shearson decision, cited approvingly by the
Ohio Supreme Court in L.A. & D. In Shearson, the Court of Appeals
for Montgomery County refused to extend the coverage of Rule 59 to a
summary judgment adjudication. The court indicated that a new trial
is not appropriate following a motion for summary judgment, because a
motion for relief following a summary judgment seeks a reconsideration of the law and not a rehearing of the facts.2" 7 The appellate court's
analysis implicitly rested on the notion that the new trial device should
not be available for reconsideration of errors of law. However, as we
have noted previously, the new trial device is and should be available to
correct errors of law in trial adjudications.20 8 More importantly, there
need not be a new trial following a grant of the new trial motion in a
bench trial. In some circumstances, a court should be free, following a
bench trial, to vacate and reverse its prior judgment without the necessity of a new trial.2 0 9
It is important to highlight the function of the new trial motion
when it is used to correct substantial legal error following a bench trial.
Regardless of the title "new trial," when used to correct legal error
following a bench trial, the new trial device functions in a manner that
is difficult to differentiate from the common law motion for reconsideration.210 Since a new trial is not required for a court to correct its own
legal error following a bench trial, the reference to a "new trial" is
somewhat misleading in that context.2 11 In some circumstances, the
trial court does no more than reconsider its prior judgment in light of
the alleged error. When viewed in this light, the limitation imposed by
the Ohio Supreme Court concerning the scope of the Rule 59 new trial
device is extremely narrow.
E. A Proposal
In the context of bench tried cases, the result of the pre-rules decision in LaBarbera, comports with the underlying purpose of the Rules
in that it provides some form of post-judgment relief in the trial court

207. Shearson, 66 Ohio App. 2d at 12, 418 N.E.2d at 1390 (1974).
208. See supra note 187.
209. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
210. Historically, the practice in the federal courts has been to treat the motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial within the meaning of FED. R. Civ. P. 59. See Jusino v.
Morales & Tio, 139 F.2d 946, 948 (lst Cir. 1944); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, 136 F.2d 771,
773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1943). In 1946, FED. R. Civ. P. 59 was amended to add subsection (E) to clarify
the fact that the district court has the power to alter or amend a judgment, provided that the ten
day time limit of FED. R. Civ. P. 59 is met. See generally 6a J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 119, 1 59.12.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
211. See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.

1988]

POST-JUDGMENT RECONSIDERATION

following a non-trial adjudication. 12 It is important, however, that we
do not misperceive the true issue. Certainly the Rules favor interpretations of pleadings that elevate substance over form to insure that substantial justice is done.2 13 However, the Ohio Supreme Court's concern
with judicial efficiency articulated in Pitts,"" outweighed the general
policy of the Rules favoring substance over form. This efficiency concern is certainly not illegitimate, especially in light of the fact that
Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(A) makes no specific reference to
the motion for reconsideration.2 1 Though harsh, the decision lends consistency and direction to litigants and trial courts in a difficult procedural area. However, when coupled with the court's ruling in L.A. & D.
the resulting gap in the Rule's coverage creates problems for the participants and from a policy perspective as well.
The current procedural gap makes little sense given the function
and purpose of the new trial device, especially when that device is considered in the context of bench tried cases. The distinction between
trial and non-trial adjudications with respect to the availability of postjudgment relief in the trial court for substantial judicial error rings
hollow. The manner of adjudication should not control the availability
of post-judgment relief for substantial judicial error since it has no substantial impact on the nature of the error committed nor on whether
that error should be addressed in the trial court. What is of significance, though, is the nature of the judicial error and the timing of the
motion for relief filed in the trial court. When a trial court makes an
error of law in the course of an adjudication which results in the entry
of a final judgment, a litigant should have available a procedural device
in the trial court to remedy that error as long as the issue is raised in a
timely manner and does not create confusion over the running of the
statutory appeal period.
In the federal system, the new trial device has always been interpreted to include relief from final judgments entered subsequent to
non-trial adjudications. 1 6 To clear up any possible confusion concerning the scope and reach of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 in nontrial adjudications, the text and title of the rule was amended in 1946
to specifically include non-trial adjudications within the scope of the

212. Labarbera, 117 Ohio App. at 275-77, 182 N.E.2d at 634-35.
213. See supra note 155.
214. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 7.
216. E.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, 136 F.2d 771, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Jusino v.
Morales & Tio, 139 F.2d 946, 948-49 (1st Cir. 1944). See 6a J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROPublished
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rule.2" 7 Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 specifically recognizes the desirability and importance of providing post-judgment relief

in non-trial adjudications. Unlike the current Ohio practice, the federal
courts make no distinction between trial and non-trial adjudications for
the purpose of post-judgment relief pursuant to Rule 59.
A review of the federal practice suggests that allowing relief from
final judgments pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 follow-

ing non-trial adjudications has not been particularly problematic. Like
Ohio courts, the federal courts have also grappled with. the confusion
created with respect to the running of the statutory appeal period when
litigants file post-judgment motions designated as motions for reconsideration or their equivalent. However, the response of the federal courts
to this problem has been markedly different from the approach of the
Ohio courts. Many federal circuit courts have taken a liberal approach
and treat all substantive motions challenging the correctness of a final
judgment that are served within ten days of the entry of judgment as

motions for new trial pursuant to Rule 59, thus automatically tolling
the statutory appeal period.21 8 Other federal circuits look to the sub-

stance of the motion to determine if it is the equivalent of a motion for
a new trial and if so will treat it as such despite its designation as a
motion for reconsideration or otherwise.2" 9 While both approaches do
justice to the policy which underlies the Rules, the per se rule is the
easiest and most efficient to administer.
The general approach taken by the federal courts is clearly more
desirable from a policy perspective than that taken by the Ohio courts.

Allowing for post-judgment review for substantial legal error in nontrial adjudications is clearly more efficient and less expensive than allowing only for appellate review. In addition, the approach eliminates

217. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(E) which was adopted in 1946 specifically authorizes a motion to
amend or alter a judgment. The addition of the subsection eliminates any doubt about the applica-.
bility of the required 10 day filing period for the FED. R. Civ. P. 59 motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(E)
was added in 1946 to clarify a problem that developed after the Eighth Circuit's decision in Boaz
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 146 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1944), wherein the appeals court found that the
district court had the inherent common law power over its own judgments in term. The appellate
court saw no problem in the district court's setting aside a dismissal without prejudice and entry
of judgment of dismissal with prejudice. However, soon after the decision statutory changes provided that the continuation of the in-term/out-of-term distinction had no effect on a district
court's power over its own judgments. See supra note 103; see also 6a J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G.
GROTHEER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 119, 1159.12[l], which states that subdivision (e) was subsequently added to FED. R. Civ. P. 59 "to care for a situation such as that arising
in [Boaz] . . . and makes clear that the district court possesses the power asserted in that case to
alter or amend a judgment after its entry." The Committee Note of 1948 added Subdivision (e),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, United States Code Service, 394 (1987). The title of FED. R.
Civ. P. 59 was simultaneously amended to read "New Trials; Amendment of Judgments."
218. See supra note 156.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/7
219. Id.
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the somewhat hollow distinction between trial and non-trial adjudication that is the cornerstone of the Ohio approach. The federal approach
is also consistent with that taken under Federal and Ohio Rule 60(A)
in regard to the correction of less substantial judicial error.
The adoption of the federal approach in Ohio would not necessarily signal a departure from the strict interpretation taken by the Ohio
Supreme Court in its decision in Pitts.2 20 The motion for reconsideration after the entry of final judgment could remain a nullity under the
Ohio Rules. However, it would be specifically replaced by the Rule 59
motion. Thus the supreme court's concern over the interpretation problem inherent in elevating substance over form could be eliminated by
clearly including under the Rule 59 umbrella the functional equivalent
of the motion for reconsideration. It is clear that under the federal
practice a valid Rule 59 motion filed within the prescribed time period
will toll the running of the statutory appeal period.22 1 Similarly, the
adoption in Ohio of an analogous provision to Rule 59(E) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will eliminate the concern underlying the
Pitts decision with respect to the tolling of the statutory appeal period,
since a properly filed Rule 59 motion would specifically toll the running
of the statutory appeal period.22 2
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined a significant procedural gap in the Rules
which leaves courts and litigants with no viable procedural device in
the trial court to remedy substantial judicial error in non-trial adjudications. This gap is the result of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in
22 3 which holds that
Pitts v. Ohio Department of Transportation
the
motion for reconsideration is a nullity, and a series of decisions narrowly interpreting the scope of the new trial device pursuant to Rule
59.224 Currently, under current Ohio practice, substantial judicial error
in the course of a non-trial adjudication cannot be corrected by the
trial court once that decision is considered final pursuant to Rule 58. In
that circumstance, a litigant has no alternative but to pursue an ap-

220. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
221. Timely motions filed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 59 suspend the finality of the judgment. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). However, successive motions do not affect the finality of judgments. See, e.g., American Sec. Bank v. Harrison Realty, Inc., 670 F.2d 317, 320 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 570 F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
953 (1978). A FED. R. Civ. P. 59 motion is timely filed if served within ten days after the entry of
judgment. Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 259, reh'g denied, 434 U.S.
1089 (1978).
222. See supra note 88.
223. 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981).
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peal-an expensive and time-consuming process.
The article suggests that this procedural gap be eliminated by an
amendment to the Rules similar to the 1948 amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59. This amendment would expand the scope
of the Rule 59 new trial motion to make it clearly applicable following
the entry of final decisions and judgments in non-trial adjudications.
Such an expansion would fill the current gap in the Rules' coverage
and recognize the importance and historical function of the common
law motion for reconsideration as it was used in the context of non-trial
adjudications.
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